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ABSTRACT 
A Sustainable Autonomic Architecture for Organically Reconfigurable Computing System based 
on SRAM Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) is proposed, modeled analytically, 
simulated, prototyped, and measured. Low-level organic elements are analyzed and designed to 
achieve novel self-monitoring, self-diagnosis, and self-repair organic properties. The prototype 
of a 2-D spatial gradient Sobel video edge-detection organic system use-case developed on a 
XC4VSX35 Xilinx Virtex-4 Video Starter Kit is presented. Experimental results demonstrate the 
applicability of the proposed architecture and provide the infrastructure to quantify the 
performance and overcome fault-handling limitations. Dynamic online autonomous functionality 
restoration after a malfunction or functionality shift due to changing requirements is achieved at 
a fine granularity by exploiting dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (PR) techniques.  
A Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based hardware/software platform for intrinsic evolvable hardware is 
designed and evaluated for digital circuit repair using a variety of well-accepted benchmarks. 
Dynamic bitstream compilation for enhanced mutation and crossover operators is achieved by 
directly manipulating the bitstream using a layered toolset. Experimental results on the edge-
detector organic system prototype have shown complete organic online refurbishment after a 
hard fault. In contrast to previous toolsets requiring many milliseconds or seconds, an average of 
0.47 microseconds is required to perform the genetic mutation, 4.2 microseconds to perform the 
single point conventional crossover, 3.1 microseconds to perform Partial Match Crossover 
(PMX) as well as Order Crossover (OX), 2.8 microseconds to perform Cycle Crossover (CX), 
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and 1.1 milliseconds for one input pattern intrinsic evaluation. These represent a performance 
advantage of three orders of magnitude over the JBITS software framework and more than seven 
orders of magnitude over the Xilinx design flow. Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) technique 
was combined with the conventional GA in what is called CGT-pruned GA to reduce repair time 
and increase system availability. Results have shown up to 37.6% convergence advantage using 
the pruned technique. 
Lastly, a quantitative stochastic sustainability model for reparable systems is formulated to 
evaluate the Sustainability of FPGA-based reparable systems. This model computes at design-
time the resources required for refurbishment to meet mission availability and lifetime 
requirements in a given fault-susceptible missions. By applying this model to MCNC benchmark 
circuits and the Sobel Edge-Detector in a realistic space mission use-case on Xilinx Virtex-4 
FPGA, we demonstrate a comprehensive model encompassing the inter-relationships between 
system sustainability and fault rates, utilized, and redundant hardware resources, repair policy 
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CHAPTER 1: IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
PROBLEM 
Attaining high availability, reliability and fault tolerance for digital systems have long been 
recognized as a crucial non-functional requisite for mission critical applications. This 
significance is further amplified in systems such as deep space and satellite systems. Those 
systems target particularly sensitive missions and hence safety and security come first on top of 
the priority list. Additionally, the cost, complexity, and restricted visibility associated with such 
systems tend to be quite significant, consequently, longevity becomes a highly sought after 
objective. This chapter introduces the problem at hand, sheds some light on the approaches 
followed herein to tackle the problem and highlights the contributions of this work. 
1.1. Need for Sustainable Systems  
Deep space missions encounter a very harsh operating environment due to radiation, terrestrial 
particles, temperature and pressure stresses, background noise, and immense electromagnetic 
fields. Such a deployment environment is inevitably one of the most fault-prone environments 
digital systems could be deployed into. Moreover, the limited possibilities to intervene at the 
incident of a failure make a self-restoration capability after upsets an extremely imperative 
characteristic to have, and the sustained spaceborne operation thus far, an increasingly 
challenging problem to solve. 
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Autonomous systems present an attractive space application as they aim to carry out complex 
tasks in harsh and more importantly dynamic and uncertain environments. Their capacity of fault 
tolerance and self-refurbishment grows in importance as the mission criticality and duration 
increases and as the environment becomes out of control and expectancy. 
SRAM-based FGPAs, like any semiconductor devices, are subject to hardware faults. These 
faults could be soft faults which are transient or persistent Single Event Upsets (SEU) [1-7], or 
hard permanent faults [8-14]. Details on FPGA faults are identified and discussed in the 
following chapter. SEUs primarily affect storage elements and since FGPAs are built up from 
memory cells, historically, SEUs have received significant attention. However, as technology 
advances towards smaller nanoscale devices, systems exhibit appealing characteristics of high 
densities, low power, smaller size and weight. Yet, technology advances introduce increased 
undesirable fault susceptibility. In addition to manufacturing defects, nano-electronic devices are 
expected to experience a high occurrence of runtime faults [15]. This trend deprecates traditional 
fault tolerance approaches and promotes autonomous innovative ones. 
FPGA repair mechanisms have been excessively explored. Repair techniques range from static 
approaches involving simple spare replacement to highly sophisticated dynamic heuristics. 
Despite the variety of these approaches, they all share a fundamental common goal of 
functionality restoration among other characteristics such as latency, redundancy, complexity, 
adaptability, coverage and sustainability.  
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Regardless of the repair approach utilized, spare resources provide flexible capacity to replace 
broken ones.  Being dynamically reconfigurable at runtime, FGPAs enable the spare granularity 
to miniaturize from modular redundancy to reconfigurable resource redundancy such as Lookup 
Tables (LUT). The amount of unutilized (spare) reconfigurable resources the mission should 
carry to sustain through the targeted period is a problem to resolve. This group of unutilized 
resources is referred to herein by the Amorphous Resource Pool (ARP). A primary concern when 
doing online refurbishment is the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). The lower the MTTR drops, 
the higher the system availability becomes. Depending on the mission requirements, there is a 
threshold of MTTR after which the mission falls below the acceptable availability level and 
hence fails. As mission progresses, cumulative faults likelihood at best remains flat, but nearly 
universally increases monotonically. It is anticipated that repair complexity becomes 
increasingly challenging. Time-to-refurbish is anticipated to increase as more parts fail. One of 
the main questions to answer becomes: What is the expected duration of a mission with 
probability of success is greater than an acceptable threshold? More specifically, how can a 
system sustain its functionality within planned mission availability and lifetime specifications 
when operating in a failure-prone ecosystem? 
A sustainable system is hereby defined as one that is sufficiently capable of achieving mission 
objectives under specified ranges of varying conditions within a fault-susceptible deployment 
environment. Unbounded survival under degrading conditions can not be possible and hence it is 
fallacious to attempt assessing system‟s sustainability for realistic missions over an infinite time 
interval. A more useful definition of a sustainable system hence becomes: a system capable to 
operate without substantial functional depreciation throughout its expected lifetime enabled by a 
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particular likely finite regeneration strategy. In the electronic systems‟ context however, the 
system is said to be sustainable if it is capable of handling imminent failures throughout its 
lifetime by taking the actions necessary to maintaining the desired performance minimum 
threshold. 
1.2. Potential for Evolvable Hardware 
Harsh operating environments, manufacturing defects, and component aging are contributing 
causes of hardware faults that make sustained availability and performance requirements 
difficult.  Many hardware reliability approaches have been proposed in the literature such as fault 
avoidance, design margin, modular redundancy, and fault refurbishment [16].  Fault avoidance-
based design approaches aim to avoid possible faults that could occur at run time.  Such 
approaches usually impose minimal size, weight, and power overheads.  Meanwhile, design 
margin approaches rely on an increased number of redundant system components and 
capabilities to enhance reliability by designing with a margin for fault tolerance. 
Despite the advantages of the above approaches, anticipating all the possible faults at design-
time may not only be impractical, but also not adaptive to dynamic deployment environments 
such as space.  On the other hand, modular redundancy approaches utilize multiple identical 
modules each of which is capable of delivering the desired functionality.  These approaches 
increase size, weight, and power consumption.  Additionally, the recovery capacity of these 
approaches is limited by the number and granularity of the available redundant modules.   
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Fault refurbishment approaches, such as the proposed approach herein, offer a very competitive 
option because of the high recovery capacity and adaptability to unforeseen conditions.  
However, fault refurbishment is challenging due to the complexity involved in generating 
configurations for implementing fault-free digital circuits on reconfigurable devices. 
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) [17] are guided trial-and-error search techniques. They use the 
principles of Darwinian evolution which target the survival of the fittest. This is essentially done 
by casting a net over the entire solution space to find high fitness regions.  The 
reprogrammability of FPGAs provides an efficient platform highly suitable for evolutionary fault 
refurbishment platforms [18].  In the event of faults in FPGAs, a GA can be used to search and 
implement alternate configurations that circumvent the faulty resource, thus providing device 
refurbishment. 
Evolutionary approaches such as Genetic Algorithms (GAs) appear throughout the literature as a 
means to realize design and repair strategies on hardware-in-the-loop FPGA-based digital 
systems [16-18]. GAs realize search strategies based on the Darwinian evolution principles by 
performing genetic operations such as mutation and crossover.  Several variations of GAs were 
introduced to enhance the performance and speed of convergence to a solution for FPGA-based 
systems [19]. However, many of these realizations employ software-in-the-loop simulations 
rather than intrinsic implementations in the FPGA fabric. Challenges of realizing practical 
intrinsic evolutionary strategies include the mapping of the genotype in the GA into its 
corresponding phenotype on the fabric, and the limited control over process automation of 
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altering and downloading safe bitstreams onto the device.  These issues are exacerbated when the 
critical portions of bitstream representation are proprietary.  
Only a handful of intrinsic evolution platforms have been proposed throughout the literature. 
However, these platforms are still inadequate since they either support a course granularity 
evolution which yields a limited capability and flexibility, or they entail huge resource overhead 
to work-around the reconfiguration limitations. This leads to a relatively high area and power 
budgets which might not be tolerable in highly constrained applications such as space mission 
systems.  
An approach that provides a fast hardware/software interface between the GA and the FPGA 
device via a straightforward data-structure and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) is 
proposed, developed, tested, and analyzed in this dissertation. A layered design is used to 
perform mapping operations at the finest granularity directly on the bitstream to modify LUT 
configurations, and reprogram the device. This approach is tailored to be invoked from within 
the system upon fault occurrence to achieve autonomous fault tolerance. 
1.3. Self-x Properties: An Organic Computing Vision 
Current high-performance processing systems are increasingly complex.  They frequently consist 
of heterogeneous processor subsystems that depend on one another in nontrivial ways, where 
each subsystem is itself a multi-component system with diverse capabilities.  The organization of 
these subsystems is typically static, determined with great care at design time and optimized for a 
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particular mode of operation.  This design strategy is appropriate for systems that will be used in 
relatively static circumstances and that will be accessible for repair when their components fail.  
However, systems that will be used in dynamic situations, or those where human intervention to 
reach for repairs once deployed is impractical, present a different set of challenges.  In these 
systems, the failure of a single component or a change in the desired mode of operation may 
result in large-scale inefficiency or even complete system failure. 
Electronic systems operating in dynamic environments, therefore, require an increased capability 
for fault tolerance and self-adaptation, especially as their system complexities and 
interdependencies continue to increase.  The realization of systems that are capable of exhibiting 
such adaptive behaviors constitutes the vision sought by Organic Computing (OC) by Schmeck 
in [20].  The organic computing paradigm places high value on the so-called self-x properties, 
which include self-configuration, self-reorganization, and self-healing [20-23].  These objectives 
must be maintained in an autonomous fashion, yet sufficiently constrained to avoid undesirable 
emergent behaviors. 
Several distinct events may necessitate a change in the configuration of a multi-component 
system.  First, a fault may occur in an individual component, which must then be replaced, 
repaired, or otherwise worked around.  While we hypothesize that hardware failure would be the 
most anticipated trigger for a configuration change, other possibilities, such as a storage device 
reaching its capacity or the temperature of a chip becoming dangerously high, could be handled 
similarly.  Second, the performance level or functional requirements imposed on the system may 
change, due to modified mission requirements or a change in the operational environment.  In 
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this case, the operation of the system components must be adapted to satisfy new requirements, 
not simply restored to a previous operational state.  In either case, existing components must be 
reconfigured accordingly. 
To decide on the appropriate actions to take in response to these events, the system must assess 
its performance, comprehend its own current state, and enable mechanisms by which it can be 
modified.  The degree to which self-reorganization and self-configuration can succeed will be 
limited by the degree to which the system is self-aware.  A self-aware system would be capable 
of matching available resources to mission priorities, maintaining self-awareness by continually 
monitoring and evaluating its own state and the state of changing requirements, and using its 
self-awareness to enable accurate and up-to-date reallocations of system resources to improve 
performance. 
Increasing the self-reliance of deployed systems would dramatically increase their dependability 
and domains of applicability.  For example, complex monitoring and recording devices able to 
operate autonomously for long periods of time without external repair are essential for reducing 
the risk involved in space missions, deep-sea missions, manned and unmanned avionic missions, 
and deployments to remote or difficult terrestrial areas.  A military or commercial satellite that 
cannot recover from a hardware failure becomes orbiting space junk, or must be replaced at great 
financial cost and societal impact.  By contrast, a sustainable, self-aware satellite would offer 
increased dependability and extended lifetime.  Even partially self-aware solutions could have 
enormous practical and economic impact, realized in terms of reduced maintenance costs, longer 
operating life, and greater autonomy of deployed hardware systems. Thus became obvious the 
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need for a practical design and implementation, which realizes an organic system platform that 
exploits the current available technology to deliver all the awareness and flexibility sought 
toward achieving sufficiently high reliability, dependability, and sustainability for critical 
systems. 
1.4. Contributions of Dissertation 
The primary focus of this work is enhancing the fault tolerance capability and quantifying the 
sustainability of digital electronic systems. This is achieved through an innovative holistic 
architecture that enables organic self-awareness embedded within the different system hierarchy-
levels. By exploiting the dynamic runtime reconfigurablity of SRAM-base FPGA technology, 
this approach encompasses an adaptive reconfigurable redundancy scheme augmented with 
enhanced intrinsic evolutionary refurbishment platform. Listed below are the dissertation‟s main 
contributions. Each innovation is discussed in details in the following chapters. 
i. Novel and comprehensive sustainable organic platform for SRAM FPGA-based mission-
critical systems: 
A two-layered architecture that integrates autonomous, organic, self-x capable hardware 
elements at the chip level with a supervisory software to monitor, diagnose, and refactor 
components at the subsystem and system levels is proposed, modeled, simulated, prototyped, 
and analyzed. This platform offers system oversight and management at multiple levels 
within the component hierarchy combining self-diagnostic capabilities of functional elements 
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with supervision from autonomic supervisory layer. High-level capabilities circumvent most 
severe impacts on mission performance, while self-repair capabilities of functional elements 
autonomously correct localized immanent hardware failures. 
ii. Innovative reconfigurable adaptive redundancy scheme: 
The proposed technique leverages the FPGA dynamic partial reconfiguration capability to 
autonomously switch between various modes of operation depending on system health at 
runtime. This technique optimizes chip area and power utilization over the state-of-the-art 
and satisfies the fault tolerance needs. Moreover, it provides an outlier-based fault 
identification tool which consistently achieves fault detection with one output-cycle latency 
for articulated faults, and eliminates the need for additional test vectors. 
The fact that the system runs most of the time in duplex mode results in substantial dynamic 
power savings compared to the traditional widely-adopted TMR scheme. This also enhances 
the chip capacity to temporally accommodate more functions within unutilized fabric area 
while running in duplex mode. Moreover, the instantaneous switching from duplex to triplex 
capability provides immediate full throughput recovery upon failure while the faulty design 
is placed under refurbishment. 
iii. Intrinsic GA evolutionary refurbishment integrated framework: 
A GA-based hardware/software framework for intrinsic evolvable hardware is designed and 
evaluated for digital circuit repair using a variety of well-accepted benchmarks. Fast GA-
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based autonomous refurbishment is achieved by exploiting dynamic bitstream compilation 
and partial reconfiguration through ultra-fast genetic operators in the micro-seconds range 
along with intrinsic fitness assessment on the real PFGA fabric. Three enhanced sorting 
genetic operators have been introduced to the digital circuit design for the first time. 
Consensus based evolution results in a design-independent, model-free refurbishment 
qualification through deterrence from dedicated pre-designed exhaustive testing cycles and 
reliance on discrepancy-based evaluation with actual functional stimuli. 
iv. Expedited GA using CGT-pruned repair technique:  
A novel technique that combines Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT)-based fault location 
algorithms with the Genetic algorithms to expedite the evolution convergence time is developed 
and analyzed. Knowledge regarding the location of hardware resource faults guides the GA 
search process to converge into complete repair in fewer generations than when the knowledge is 
unavailable. Experiments have shown that CGT-pruned genetic algorithm yields completely 
refurbished FPGA configurations in 37.6% fewer generations on average than a conventional 
GA. 
v. Quantitative stochastic sustainability model for FPGA-based reparable systems: 
A quantitative stochastic sustainability model for FPGA-based reparable systems is formulated 
and analyzed. This model estimates at design-time the resources required for refurbishment in 
order to meet mission availability and lifetime requirements in a given ecosystem of different 
fault types, rates, and impact. Hence, sustainability analysis provides analytical tools to refine 
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design appropriately within budget, area, power, and weight constraints. This model is applied to 
circuits from the MCNC benchmark set with variations of parameters for illustration. Moreover, 
the sustainability of a realistic space mission use-case is analyzed. The analysis is repeated to 
demonstrate how mission‟s sustainability and useful lifetime can be extended by exploiting 
FPGA resources available aboard when adopting the aforementioned developed Organic 
refurbishment platform. 
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
Throughout the literature, FPGA technology has been recognized as the best hardware platform 
available with the sufficient reconfigurability and flexibility features needed in dynamically 
evolving systems. Such systems are reconfigured either to achieve a refurbishment or to meet 
changing requirements. Similarly, FPGAs are the best candidates for practical organic computing 
implementations. Several fault tolerance paradigms have been explored and perhaps the most 
efficient and less limited ones are the evolutionary ones such as the GA based approaches. 
2.1. Evolution of Digital Circuit Design and Repair Tasks 
Previous work on fault tolerance in FPGA-based systems varies from pre-defined design-time 
approaches, to completely adaptive GA-based run-time repair approaches.  For example, in the 
pre-compiled column-based dual FPGA architecture approach [24], FPGA configurations created 
at design-time are utilized for error detection and fault-circumvention.  These precompiled 
configurations have the same functional design but utilize different set of reconfigurable columns 
on the chip through different placement and routing constraints.  Loading these configurations 
successively emulates shifting configurations‟ columns.  The process continues until the column 
with the culprit resource is not used by the loaded configuration anymore.  In this approach fault 
isolation is achieved by using distributed Concurrent Error Detection (CED) checkers while 
performing the blind reconfiguration.  However, the repair process is not evolutionary and is 
limited by the number of available precompiled configurations.  Also the solutions obtained 
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might lead to a high subset of resources being excluded from the operational resources as the 
granularity of the solutions is at the column level which is considered substantially high. 
Moreover, this approach scales quite poorly with multiple faults. 
A traditional widely adopted fault tolerance technique is the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) 
[25]. In [16], fault tolerance is accomplished through TMR by utilizing a voting system that 
votes amongst three functionally-identical modules.  Upon fault detection, the faulty module 
undergoes offline evolutionary repair without the need to perform fault isolation.  Other 
evolutionary approaches to fault tolerance include [26] and [27], however, it is only in [28] and 
[29] that resource performance information is obtained, maintained and then used as feedback in 
the repair process. However, in [28] it is the configuration performance information that is 
maintained rather than the performance of the resources themselves.  In [29] performance 
information at the resource level is maintained, however, this approach has issues such as high 
fault detection latency, performance degradation in the absence of fault, and increased 
operational complexity. 
In [30], the authors present results from the adaptation of various CGT algorithms for fault 
isolation in FPGAs.  Runtime fault detection without using special test vectors is achieved by 
repeatedly comparing the outputs of configurations for discrepancies as described in [31].  The 
presence of a faulty output ascertained using bit-wise output comparison with an ideal output 
provides information regarding the fitness of individual resources used by the configuration. 
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There are two paradigms for implementing GAs in reconfigurable applications: Extrinsic 
Evolution via functional models that abstract the physical aspects of the real device, and Intrinsic 
Evolution on the actual devices. Extrinsic approaches simplify the evolution process as they 
operate on software models of the FPGAs.  However for applications like in-situ fault handling 
on deep space missions, not all fault types can be readily accommodated within software models. 
Additionally, abstracting the physical aspects of the target device complicates rendering the final 
designs into actual on-board circuits, for instance, limitations such as routability of the design 
cannot be ensured until the final stages of the configuration process. Furthermore, fitness 
evaluation on hardware usually requires less time than software simulations, and that makes 
intrinsic evolution mostly considered for its higher performance and scalability as an efficient 
approach to realizing physical designs in critical systems. 
Several previous research efforts have addressed intrinsic evolution. A successful attempt on 
Field Programmable Transistor Array (FPTA) chips was carried out by [18]. The authors 
proposed new ideas for long-term hardware reliability using evolvable hardware techniques via 
an evolutionary design tool named EHWPack that facilitates intrinsic evolution by incorporating 
the PGAPack genetic engine with Labview test-bed running on UNIX workstation. They were 
able to intrinsically evolve a Digital XNOR Gate on two connected FPTA boards. In this 
dissertation, we target FPGAs rather than FPTAs and specifically the popular Xilinx Virtex 
family device. 
Miller, Thomson, and Fogarty [17] previously addressed the importance of direct evolution on 
the Xilinx 6216 FPGA devices; the research explored the effect of the device physical constraints 
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on evolving digital circuits. A mapping between the representation genotype and the device 
phenotype was proposed, however, no implementation details were presented.  Hollingworth, 
Smith, and Tyrrell developed intrinsic evolution platform for a 2-bit adder on a Xilinx FPGA 
with partial reconfiguration to improve evolution time [32]. However, they used the JBits 
interface for run-time reconfiguration.  JBits is Java-based, and being interpreted can face 
scalability and performance issues and is no longer supported.  
Another way to achieve online reconfigurability is proposed by Upegui, Peña-Reyes, and 
Sanchez in [33]. In this approach, the system is divided into sub-modules, and several different 
partial reconfiguration bitstreams are generated in advance for each module using Xilinx Module 
Based Partial Reconfiguration flow. GA combines partial bitstreams that best perform the 
required task optimally or sub-optimally. This simulated approach is constrained by the limited 
number of possible combinations generated beforehand. Furthermore, its course granularity 
makes it only suitable for certain applications where the system can be divided into well-defined 
modules with fixed interfaces such as the neural network use case discussed by the authors. 
A promising technique called the Virtual Reconfigurable Circuit (VRC) method was proposed by 
Sekanina in [34] and [35] and also in a similar work by Glette and Torresen [36]. This method 
does not change the bitstream of the FPGA itself, but rather changes the register values of a 
reconfigurable circuit already implemented on the FPGA, and obtains virtual reconfigurability. 
Although this method provides online reconfigurability, it incurs a very high area and power 
overhead and could increase the number of elements that can break from a fault tolerance point 
of view. Moreover, these schemes implement phenotype abstraction by predefining several 
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functions that can be performed by a computational cell. Although, this abstraction has shown 
benefit in convergence time in some cases [10], it incurs mapping overhead and adds constraints 
to the flexibility which limits the search space and does not fully exploit the hardware capability. 
In several previous works [4, 37, 38], methodologies are proposed to enable runtime FPGA 
reconfiguration while keeping the Xilinx CAD tools out of the loop to achieve smaller 
reconfiguration delays. Such approaches can be used as platforms to achieving tractable intrinsic 
evolution. 
In a previous work within our research group, a Multilayer Runtime Reconfiguration 
Architecture (MRRA) was developed for Autonomous Runtime Partial Reconfiguration of 
FPGA devices [39]. The tool comprises three layers, namely Logic, Translation, and 
Reconfiguration layers, with well-defined interfaces for modularity and reuse. In addition, a 
standard set of Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) was utilized for communication with 
the target device. Results had shown the ability of the framework to support autonomous and 
dynamic reconfiguration operations.  We have extended the MRRA platform to support two 
basic genetic operators [40] which is further extended herein to support five enhanced genetic 
operators namely: Single point conventional crossover, Partial Match Crossover (PMX) [41], 
Order Crossover (OX) [41, 42], Cycle Crossover (CX) [42, 43], and Genetic Mutation directly to 
realize intrinsic evolution on Xilinx Virtex-4 devices. All five genetic operators are evaluated 
experimentally and results are compared for their ability to achieve fault repair in a number of 
fault handling scenarios. This intrinsic evolution platform is used as part of the proposed solution 
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to achieve evolutionary refurbishment of the faulty configurations reported by the organic layer 
as will be discussed later in Chapter 3. 
2.2. Organic Computing Concepts 
The field of organic computing is beginning to demonstrate promising results at the level of 
single chips.  A widely known generic OC platform called the Autonomous System-on-a-Chip 
(ASoC) architecture, proposed in [22], is depicted in Figure 1.  The ASoC platform consists of 
two layers: the Functional Layer and the Autonomic Layer.  The ASoC Autonomic Layer 
contains Autonomic Elements (AEs) that are responsible for correct operation of the 
corresponding Functional Elements (FEs) present on the Functional Layer.  Each FE (e.g., CPU, 
RAM, and Network Interface) has a counterpart Monitor / Evaluator / Actuator component 
within the Autonomic Layer. 
Within the ASoC architecture, the Autonomic Layer also contains an Autonomic Supervisor 
(AS), which has no counterpart on the Functional Layer.  The autonomic supervisor is 
responsible for maintaining the correct functionality of all the elements on the Autonomic Layer.  
The manner in which it operates is not specified by the ASoC architecture.  Thus, the current 
proposal is largely concerned with defining the AS role and capabilities of the autonomic 
supervisor in more detail as comprehensive Cognitive Layer. 
OC systems adhering to the ASoC architecture rely on self-organization to respond to internal 
imbalances and changing environmental conditions [21, 44, 45].  Reconfigurable logic devices 
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such as FPGAs are known to offer an attractive hardware platform for these systems, and provide 
the organic architecture with sufficient capability for exhibiting self-adaptive behavior [20-23].  
Specifically, SRAM-based FPGA devices can realize self-adaptation within their reconfigurable 
logic fabric [28, 46, 47].  These approaches are capable of detecting certain types of internal 
errors as well as initiating reconfiguration when necessary within a single FPGA [40]. 
Beyond self-monitoring and self-repairing at the level of a single chip, we seek to confer these 
properties to the larger mission-level systems which utilize them.  In order to incorporate the 
System-on-a-Chip autonomy into an organic-computing subsystem, system, or system-of-
systems, it is necessary to monitor the functionality of the AEs within each chip, and to manage 
the impact of reduced chip functionality due to either permanent or transient faults while repairs 
are ongoing.  Within the single-chip architecture, no provisions are attempted for maintaining the 
correctness of the AS‟s behavior.  Finally, the self-repair process within an individual chip may 
be intractable due to larger than local permanent damages, so a strategy is needed for handling 
the impact of chip-level failures. 
Within a complex system composed of many components, self-repair can take place at multiple 
levels.  First, individual components may be able to repair themselves without changing their 
roles within the overall system.  Second, the system may be able to restore its overall 




Figure 1. Autonomous-System-on-a-Chip architecture [22].  
The system may also be able to optimize its overall operational performance by applying both 
approaches concurrently.  These approached can be applied within the Organic Layer. 
Recent efforts in organic computing, as already discussed, address primarily the first type of 
recovery, in which components repair themselves in an application-independent fashion.  This 
application-independent repair is quite appropriate for the lowest-level components of the system 
that perform primitive functions.  The primary goal towards attaining sustainability at the 
component-level is refurbishment of individual components to their original functionality.  When 
this is tractable, a single-chip repair is sufficient to recover functionality and maintain 
performance.   
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These circumstances do not apply to composites of subsystems, let alone for an entire system 
like a satellite containing over 100 FPGA devices dedicated to tasks ranging from signal 
processing to encryption.  At the system level, repair strategies may be more diverse and become 
more closely coupled with mission requirements.   Acceptable behavior may be defined by an 
envelope of metric values rather than a single function, and different types of suboptimal 
performance can be assigned different valuations depending on mission requirements.  
Approaches to guaranteeing correct functionality of the mission are complexly correlated with 
the performance of individual elements.  These complexities can be addressed within the 
Cognitive Layer in our proposed architecture discussed in the following chapter.   
In the Cognitive Layer, an application-dependent knowledge-based approach can be utilized to 
perform fault detection, system repair, and resource reallocation activities reliably and in a 
reasonable amount of time.  Simultaneously, at the resource level, components ranging from 
sensors and actuators to processors and memory elements must individually operate within their 
specified tolerances to maintain acceptable performance levels.  
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2.3. Sustainability Analysis 
The term sustainability is repeatedly used in ecology, economics, sociology, and environmental 
sciences and their interactions [48-50]. It refers to the equilibrium state of consumption versus 
regeneration within some open or closed system. The term Sustainability, has been applied to 
computer applications on a limited scale. For example, in [51], Seacord, et al. developed a 
sustainability model for computer software planning and management which enables the balance 
between the sustainment team and the customer modification requests. In [52], Watari, et al. 
proposed a solution to increase the sustainability of computer networks which defines the 
sustainability as the balance between failure events and the autonomous dynamic reconfiguration 
to retain connectivity. In [53], Mocigemba explains the transfer of the term Sustainability into the 
IT world as being the balance between economic, social and ecological interests. The term can 
be further studied and refined [54]. This dissertation formulates the sustainability concept into 
the digital electronics domain and specifically with pertinent use cases of autonomous designs 
deployed into error-prone unpredictable environments. In this context, Sustainability refers to the 
equilibrium state of failure and repair events the system undergoes while retaining functionality 
over mission lifetime. To the best of our knowledge, sustainability is yet to be addressed from 
the proposed perspective.  
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2.3.1. Need for Sustainability Analysis 
Sustainability analysis in this context might be analogous to what is referred to in the literature 
by reparable systems mission reliability. Mission system reliability of reparable and non-
reparable systems has been addressed in plethora of published articles in the literature. In 
general, the approaches can be divided into two main categories: topological or combinatorial 
modeling and state-space modeling.   
In the combinatorial modeling, the system is mapped into a fixed structure or network. Such 
approaches primarily use fault trees and reliability block diagrams. Fault tree is the logical 
mapping of system‟s physical design. It depicts the relations between certain causes and basic 
events that lead to major failure events so called “Top events” [55-57]. There are two main 
approaches to calculate system reliability from fault trees: qualitative based on the min-cut 
analysis as electrical circuits have s-coherent fault trees [58, 59] and quantitative based on 
probabilistic evaluation [60]. In the qualitative techniques, Boolean equations are formulated for 
top-level failure events. Then Boolean algebra is used to calculate the exact time of failures. 
Alternatively, simulations can be used. On the other hand, the quantitative approaches, build the 
s-coherent fault tree for the design by calculating the probability of basic events based on 
component‟s failure probability density function (pdf). And then a probabilistic evaluation can 
be constructed for top-level events by evaluating the min-cuts of the fault tree. To reduce the 
complexity, the min-cuts can be approximated by calculating the upper and lower bound 
probabilities for top-level events. 
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In summary, combinatorial modeling techniques have high computational complexity that could 
become intractable for large systems. Furthermore, its complexity scales up exponentially with 
design size despite the proposed enhancements such as reduced-edges and importance sampling 
[61]. Additionally, these techniques are only suitable for static designs and can only address 
failure modes known at design time. Therefore, this class of approaches falls short with 
reconfigurable systems deployed in dynamic environments. 
On the other hand, in the state-space modeling techniques [34, 35, 38, 62], all system states get 
defined based on component possible states. A component has two states: functional, or 
degraded. For non-reparable systems, the probability of a component going from degraded state 
to functional state is zero. In reparable systems a component can go back and forth between these 
two states with certain failure and repair probabilities. After that time, a probabilistic modeling 
for component state transition is formulated and accordingly a probabilistic system state 
transition is formulated to find the probabilities of the top-level failure events. These mainly 
employ Markov chains and Petri-nets. 
This class of approaches works well for simple systems with few components or for large 
systems but at a coarse granularity as subsystem-level, i.e. failures and repairs are considered as 
per subsystem and no consideration is made to intra-subsystem events at the component-level. 
Otherwise, it may end up with a very large state space that may require lumping to become 
tractable such as mergeable Markov states and non-effective edge elimination [33], or splitting 
and simulation such as Markov Chain Monte-Carlo MCMC [63].  
36 
Although the aforementioned techniques from both categories tackle the problem of system 
reliability calculation differently, they can be all computationally intensive, fairly complex to 
formulate and exhibit NP-hard time complexity to resolve when applied at component 
granularity. Moreover, they are poorly scalable and best fit for either small systems with very 
limited number of components or being applied at a coarse granularity in which failures are 
considered at sub-system level. Real-life applications include FPGA designs with hundreds or 
thousands of reconfigurable resources that can span multiple chips. For example, NASA 
THEMIS mission has a reconfigurable payload called ARTEMIS of 3 Xilinx V4LX160 FPGA 
devices to perform configurable band-pass processing and Fast Fourier Transformations (FFT) 
on instrument data [64]. This represents an example of a mission critical application deployed in 
a very harsh environment with high number or reconfigurable resources that can be intractable to 
analyze using the aforementioned techniques. 
The presented work aims at practically estimating the sustainability of FGPA-based reparable 
systems. It benefits from the particular FGPA‟s trait being built up from highly interconnected 
identical resources: Lookup Tables (LUT), Input/Output Blocks (IOB), nets, flip-flops, and 
MUXs”. These resources have identical and statistically independent probabilistic failure 
distributions.  
The majority of FPGA reliability calculation and enhancement related work targeted 
manufacturing defects or soft faults [65]. Being built from SRAM cells, FPGAs are subject to 
many runtime failures due to environmental and structural reasons. There are several approaches 
in the literature to enhance the reliability of the FPGA-based systems [66]. Few have addressed 
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the runtime reliability of FPGA-based systems in realistic mission use cases, and much less are 
those which have explored the reparable fault tolerant system‟s varying reliability throughout the 
mission lifetime. In this dissertation we introduce a concept called the sustainability of reparable 
fault tolerant FGPA-based systems. It provides a practical topology-agnostic stochastic method 
for evaluating the repair technique and the resource allocation to attain certain level of system 
availability for targeted mission duration. 
2.3.2. SRAM-based Fault Modeling 
FGPAs are subject to two main categories of faults: Soft and Hard faults as shown in Table 1. 
Soft faults are mainly Single Event Upsets (SEU) caused when a high-energy particle such as 
proton, neutron, alpha, or heavy ion strikes a storage element e.g. LUT, IOB, Flip-Flop, etc. This 
fault is manifested by a logical value inversion of that element. When the SEU occurs in the 
datapath flops or memories, it is transient in the sense that it only affects the data being 
processed at the time of the SEU and usually disappears after that. On the other hand, if the SEU 
impacts a configuration memory element, it causes the design to malfunction and hence called 
Firm Soft Faults. Firm soft errors can be readily recovered by reprogramming the device with the 
original configuration known as scrubbing [67]. Firm soft faults in the reconfiguration circuitry 
could disrupt any further scrubbing attempts and hence require total system re-initialization 
which may not be possible during mission. We call such faults Persistent Soft Faults. These 
faults are treated as permanent hard faults from reliability point of view [7].  
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Hard faults, on the other hand, entail permanent physical damage to the device substrate. There 
are three main causes of hard faults: manufacturing defects due to process imperfections known 
as the Infant Mortality defects, Total Ionization Dose (TID) radiation-induced and aging-induced 
faults [68].  Aging induced faults include: Electromigration (EM), Time-Dependent Dielectric 
Breakdown (TDDB), Hot Carrier Effect/Injection (HCE/HCI), and Negative Bias Thermal 
Instability (NBTI). EM is the phenomenon of electron depletion in very thin wires with increased 
temperature. This creates a highly resistive path which entails high net delays that causes the 
system to fail to meet timing or can result in open circuit “stuck at open” [11, 12]. TDDB is the 
incident when electrons are trapped in the imperfections of the oxide well enough to create a 
very low resistive path “short circuit” at the transistor gate terminal which results in flipping 
transistor state and sluggish transistor switching characteristics. TDDB rate increases at high 
temperatures and thin oxide layers [8-10]. HCI describes the phenomenon in which carriers gain 
sufficient energy to be injected into the gate oxide. The damage results in degradation in the 
transistor switching frequency, which can affect design frequency limit as well as functional 
malfunction as the path seizes to meet timing [11, 13]. NBTI occurs when holes in the 
PMOSFET inverted channel interact with Si compounds to produce donor type interface states 
and possibly positive fixed charge [11, 14]. 
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Table 1. SRAM-Based FPGA Fault Characteristics 
Cat. Type Cause Affected 
Resources 
Volatility Refurbish-
ment Source Description 
Soft SET Radiation Soft Error Transient. Cause: SEU (high-
energy particle “proton, neutrons, alpha, 
heavy ion” striking a storage element) 
Design flops 
and memory 
Transient Not needed 











Hard Manufacture Infant 
Mortality 
Process Imperfections All Permanent Mask out 
TID Radiation Change switching char. LUT, IOBs, 
MUXs, FF 
Permanent Avoid 
TDDB Aging Electrons trapped in imperfections of the 
oxide well enough to create very low resistive 




EM Aging Electron depletion in very thin wires with 
increased temp. creates a highly resistive path  
Interconnect Permanent Avoid 




Permanent Avoid on 
Critical Path 
NBTI Aging Temperature distribution, PAR dependent LUT, IOBs, 
BRAM 
Permanent Avoid on 
Critical Path 
* 95% of memory elements including BRAM is configuration memory.
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In this work, Soft faults will not be considered in our analysis due to their transient nature and 
straightforward resolution. Likewise, Infant Mortality faults will be disregarded too since they 
can be identified through exhaustive testing in design qualification and bring-up process. 
Radiation induced hard faults will also be ignored due to the assurance from the FPGA 
manufacturers through their published reliability reports [3]. For example, in [70] Alfke et al. 
indicate that XQR4000XL radiation-hardened device family exhibits latch-up immunity at 
LET>100 MeVcm2/mg at 125°C. 
Therefore, the analysis herein will consider aging induced faults only. These faults exist and 
need to be address [67, 71]. This requires refurbishment techniques that involve reconfiguring 
the device to avoid using the broken components. Hard faults may occur during the operational 
phase flat region of the bath tub shown in Figure 2. However, since the use cases of interest in 
this research exceed the useful life we concentrate on the wear out period in the following 
analysis. For instance, a 90-nm SRAM-based FPGA device indicates 3-year useful life under 
125°C [72] while the use case discussed in Chapter 6 has a 8-year lifetime requirement under 
stressful conditions. Furthermore, runtime hard faults are anticipated to become more frequent as 
CMOS-based devices are shrinking in size and hence reliability has become the most critical 
challenge facing future nanoelectronics [15].  
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Figure 2. The Bathtub Curve [73] 
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CHAPTER 3: MULTI-LAYER HIGH-LONGEVITY ARCHITECTURE 
In order to address the limitations of existing approaches, as discussed in the previous chapter, a 
two-layered architecture that integrates autonomous, organic, self-x capable hardware elements 
at the chip level with supervisory software to monitor, diagnose, and refactor components at the 
subsystem and system levels is proposed, developed, and evaluated.  This approach makes use of 
the self-monitoring and self-healing properties of the individual chips, while providing an 
additional cognition capability for higher-level fault detection, mission-specific optimization, 
and adaptation to changing mission priorities. 
3.1. System Architecture 
This novel architecture consists of a hardware-based organic layer and a software-based 
cognitive layer.  Components at the organic layer are organized into overlapping functional 
groups, each of which bears responsibility for a particular set of mission-relevant tasks.  Within 
the cognitive layer, monitoring and diagnostic processes continually track the behavior of these 
functional groups and determine whether their behavior characteristics fall within expected 
profiles.  
As shown in Figure 3, the Cognitive Layer consists of four components: Process Model, 
Operation Manager (OM), Performance Monitor (PM), and Autonomic Supervisor (AS).   The 
Organic Layer, on the other hand, consists of organic units each has one Autonomic Element 
(AE) and three Functional Elements (FEs) reside on the FPGA fabric. Starting in the lower left 
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corner of FPGA 1, two FEs process the inputs in duplicate using a Concurrent Error Detection 
arrangement while the third FE is a cold standby to conserve power over a Triple Modular 
Redundancy (TMR) [25] configuration.  The functional outputs of the duplicate FEs are 
monitored by the AE on FPGA 1 for autonomous fault detection, isolation, resolution, and 
possibly self-repair using the intrinsic evolutionary repair platform discussed in the proceeding 
section.  
 
Figure 3. Soar-Longevity Conceptual Architecture 
Simultaneously, the same FE outputs are sent as Observations to the PM in the Cognitive Layer. 
The PM normalizes the FEs performance information on an absolute scale ranging from 0 to 1, 
and passes the normalized value to the OM. The OM detects any discrepancy between the 
requirements dictated by process model and the observed performance.  When their difference 
exceeds tolerances, the OM reacts accordingly. 
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Thus, the Cognitive Layer interacts with the Organic Layer by: 
 Managing multiple organic units on multiple FPGAs, each containing one AE, two active 
FEs and one dormant FE  
 Receiving status reports from AEs via the Cognitive Layer Stub (CLS). 
 Determining whether output conforms to expected profiles via the PM 
 When tolerances are exceeded or mission priorities change, reasoning over knowledge in 
the Process Model about what to do next:  
o Wait for affected FPGAs to self-repair? 
o Reroute traffic to a redundant FPGA? 
o Redistribute work load across viable components? 
Finally, key components of the Cognitive Layer can be implemented as an organic FPGA device 
to provide it with certain self-x properties. 
Realization of the Soar-Longevity architecture would enhance the ability of organic computing 
systems to monitor system capability during execution, by incorporating a cognitive 
understanding of how the performance of individual components can combine to generate overall 
system performance.  It would also improve organic computing systems‟ ability to manage and 
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configure system resources, by allowing system-level reorganization in response to component-
level hardware failures. This approach combines a number of innovative aspects within an 
overall solution. Some of the novel features of the developed architecture are outlined in Table 2. 
Table 2. Innovative aspects of the Soar-Longevity approach. 
Feature Innovation 
System oversight and management at 
multiple levels within the component 
hierarchy 
Combining self-diagnostic capabilities of functional elements with 
oversight from autonomic supervisor; high-level capabilities circumvent 
most severe impacts on mission performance, while self-repair 
capabilities of functional elements autonomously correct localized 
failures 
Uniform AE design Pre-determined design for Autonomic Elements (AEs) despite the fact 
that they monitor different types of Functional Elements (FEs) 
Outlier-based Fault Identification  Elimination of additional test vectors while detecting first discrepant 
output.  
Model-free Refurbishment Qualification Deterrence from dedicated pre-designed exhaustive testing cycles for 
refurbished design qualification and reliance on discrepancy-based 
evaluation with actual functional stimuli. 
Intrinsic Evolutionary self-heal Fast GA-based autonomous refurbishment with intrinsic fitness 
assessment on the real PFGA fabric 
Another important aspect is the orientation of the Cognitive Layer on the board outside of the 
critical path of execution. Consequently, while a blocking failure will remove the ability of the 
Cognitive Layer to provide part of the self-x capabilities to the system, the system‟s primary 
functionality and hardware-realized organic properties are not affected. 
Typically, the Organic Layer should resolve any upset upon failure by itself and regain full 
functionality.  This self-repair is performed by reconfiguring the component using pre-generated 
configuration bitstreams that provide comparable performance to the initially loaded 
configuration, or through evolutionary repair supported by the intrinsic evolution platform 
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proposed herein.  However, depending on the scope and severity of the fault, this option may not 
be available.  Consider the case where the board‟s image filtering FPGA has a logical stuck-at-
zero fault on the input of one of its look-up tables.  The chip has detected a local failure, and has 
already informed the Cognitive Layer of the fault, and attempted to circumvent that failure.  
However, by examining the chip‟s performance after refurbishment and comparing it against its 
process model, it turns out that the new configuration is only allowing the chip to achieve 15dB 
SNR, which is less than the 20dB specified in the mission requirements.  Here, the cognitive 
layer uses its knowledge of the board-level capabilities and any flexibility defined within the 
mission requirements to determine and implement a course of action. 
The Cognitive Layer needs to know the level of impairment and the repair status of each 
autonomous element.  Some of this information can be derived by observing functioning 
autonomous elements and comparing their behavior characteristics to acceptable ranges.  
However, since the autonomous elements gather extremely detailed data as to their functioning 
and use this data to produce quantitative measures of their fitness, they themselves are the best 
source of information as to their current capabilities.  In the other direction, the autonomous 
elements need to be informed of reorganization requests. 
The autonomous functional elements have the ability of self-monitoring through Concurrent 
Error Detection (CED) with Stand-by (SB) [74].  To invoke its self-healing mode, it must be able 
on its own to detect errors during run-time [75-77]. Reconfiguration and detection techniques 
explored include scrubbing, which is the continuous reconfiguration of the bitstream to refresh 
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the stored configuration [78], Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) techniques [79] on-chip hardware test 
benches [80], and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [25, 74].   
The information regarding the current state of the autonomous elements present within the 
Organic Layer is conveyed upward to the Cognitive Layer through an interface, as shown in 
Figure 2. To the extent that quantitative information can be made available to the Cognitive 
Layer, it can be used to weigh the utility of reconfiguring components against the cost of waiting 
for a temporarily impaired component to finish refurbishing itself.  In order for this information 
to be transferred between the Cognitive Layer and the Organic Layer, we have designed and 
developed an interlayer data exchange protocol described in the following sections. 
Mission priorities will be higher for some types of tasks than for others, or for some performance 
metrics applied to individual tasks.  This will influence the allocation of resources in various 
ways.  For instance, autonomous elements are only partially available during self-repair, so 
partially impaired elements may be temporarily taken off-line or reassigned by the Cognitive 
Layer, depending on their mission criticality.  Similarly, self-repair may not completely succeed, 
and repaired elements may be considered less reliable than pristine elements.  This will also 
affect the allocation of resources.  The overall goal is that the system becomes self-aware at the 
chip level as well as the system level and thus able to respond appropriately to problems arising 
at all levels. 
Cognitive Layer design is beyond the scope of this dissertation. The focus hereafter will be 
primarily on the Organic Layer design, implementation, and evaluation. 
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3.2. Organic Layer Design and Implementation 
It is implied from the discussion in the previous chapters that the Organic Layer should be 
designed and implemented in a structured manner that not only would allow the layer to exhibit 
its self-x properties such as the self-reporting, self-diagnosis, and self-repair, but also should be 
able to perform all these tasks in a timely manner that copes with the criticality of the target 
application. Furthermore, the Organic Layer should carry out the communication with the 
Cognitive Layer concurrently while monitoring its elements and delivering the required 
functional output. 
3.2.1. Organic Layer Architecture 
The Organic Layer is exclusively implemented on hardware. However, it is accompanied with 
three software components which provide the interface with the Cognitive Layer.  The Organic 
Layer consists of one or more Organic Units (OU) and Dispatchers configured on one or 
multiple FPGA chips as shown in Figure 4. The OU is the smallest integrated unit in the organic 
layer. It consists of one AE and three FEs. Initially, it is configured to be in duplex mode in 
which only two FEs are online and the third is a cold-spare standby. If a fault is detected, the AE 
switches to TMR mode (i.e. puts the cold-spare FE online and implements a voting scheme). An 
FPGA can accommodate one or more organic unites based on the unit complexity and the FPGA 
resources. The Dispatcher on the other hand is responsible for directing the full duplex 
communication flow from the JTAG port to the destination AE in the selected OU and vice 
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versa. One Dispatcher is needed per FPGA chip to handle all the communication routing 
amongst the OUs implemented on that chip. 
 
Figure 4. Organic Layer Architecture 
The first Organic Layer – Cognitive Layer interfacing component is the Autonomic Element Stub 
(AES), responsible for polling the messages from the AEs through a physical link (JTAG 
connection) and delivering them to the Cognitive Layer through sockets. The second component 
is the Functional Element Stub (FES), responsible for polling the messages concerning the FEs 
performance through a physical link (JTAG connection) and delivering them to the Performance 




Figure 5. AES  and FES Class Diagram 
51 
The last software component is the Reconfiguration Manager (RM), which is responsible for 
performing reconfiguration requests as well as running refurbishment algorithms (e.g. Genetic 
Algorithm). Figure 5 shows the class diagram design for the AES and the FES. A concise 
description of each of the classes shown in the class diagram is listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. AES and FES Class Description 
Class Description 
Connection Responsible for managing the physical communication with 
the external modules. It supports two implementations (USB, 
Socket). 
CommunicationController Manages one or many connections (e.g. multiple USB 
connections to different AEs). Instantiated and used by the 
module managers. 
Message Simple class that carries message information. 
Timer Responsible for firing cyclic events to module managers to 
support periodic processes (e.g. polling messages, manage 
Inbox, etc…) 
Dispatcher Added to implement asynchronous communication between 
module managers 
AEManager Holds detailed view of the organic layer (could be read from a 
configuration file that contains the organic layer structure such 
as available AEs/FEs and their addresses) and manages 
sending and receiving messages to/from AEs. 
ASManager Responsible for sending and receiving messages to/from AS.  
RMManager Controls initiating refurbishment and reporting results. 
FEManager Holds details of the FEs in the organic layer and manages 
receiving functional output from the FEs. 
PMManager Responsible for sending messages to the PM in the CL. 
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Figure 6 shows the architectural details of the OL Dispatcher module. 
FPGA Chip
JTAG













































Figure 6. Organic Layer Dispatcher Architecture 
The idea of grouping the AE and its associated three FEs within the logical concept of the 
Organic Unit rather than assigning one AE per FPGA chip makes possible to have several 
Organic Units coexisting in the same chip. This increases the flexibility of the system to 
efficiently accommodate several heterogeneous organic functional elements simultaneously on 
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the same chip, or even to divide one large functional element into multiple organic small 
functional elements within their corresponding Organic Units to increase fault tolerance at a finer 
granularity.  
In each Organic Unit, initially, only two FEs are operational while the third is kept offline as a 
cold spare. This configuration mode is called the Duplex mode of operation. It is possible to 
instantly detect any functional fault under the duplex mode by simply monitoring the outputs of 
the two identical FEs. Upon discrepancy between the two outputs, which indicates fault 
occurrence, the AE switches to Triplex mode of operation by putting the standby third FE online 
and enabling a voting scheme amongst the three FE‟s to elicit the correct output and identify the 
faulty FE. The identified faulty FE is placed under in situ refurbishment immediately by the 
means the intrinsic Genetic Algorithm. This autonomous localized organic behavior inherent 
within the OU is referred to hereafter by Reconfigurable Adaptive Redundancy Scheme (RARS). 
While the duplex mode has a shortcoming of wasting one clock cycle upon fault occurrence till 
the correct functional output is regained, it saves 33% of the dynamic power over the industry 
standard TMR arrangement in the no fault running situation. Power savings are quantified for a 
realistic space mission use-case in Chapter 6. Moreover, the fact that the standby FE is normally 
offline makes its resources available for use by other functional elements. 
The proposed architecture for the Organic Unit is shown in Figure 7. The functional input is 
delivered directly to the three FEs for evaluation. The outputs of the FEs are then sent to the AE 
to be processed by three modules: the Discrepancy Detector, Voter, and the Output Actuator.   
54 
 
Figure 7. Organic Unit Architecture 
The Discrepancy Detector detects the occurrence of a discrepancy between the two online AEs. 
This module is only active when the Organic Unit is running in the duplex mode and is disabled 
otherwise to save power. From its name, the Voter module performs the bitwise voting between 
the three FEs outputs and produces the majority vote output. It also generates a report that 
indicates which of the three FEs is the faulty one in the case of a single faulty FE or indicates 
that the three FEs are discrepant in the case of multiple faulty FEs. Because the Voter is 
performing bitwise voting, the probability of getting a correct majority vote is still very high 
even in the cases when multiple FEs are faulty since it is unlikely that two FEs will articulate 
their faults similarly. The Voter is enabled only in the triplex mode and is disabled otherwise 
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again to save power. The Output Actuator is controlled by the Autonomic Controller to pass 
through one of its four inputs and possibly mask output portions according to the Voter report. 
On the other hand, the Autonomic Controller is the Finite State Machine (FSM) that orchestrates 
the AE different modules interactions. It is responsible for all the awareness needed about the 
FEs health status, performance, current state of the unit, and the organic decision making. 
Furthermore, it is responsible for conducting status reports and receiving control signals from/to 
the Cognitive Layer. In order for such communication to take place gracefully and be able to 
handle the one-to-many (Cognitive Layer to multiple OUs) two way communication, a message-
based full duplex protocol is developed that satisfies the currently proposed features and yet 
expandable to incorporate new messages to support additional features. This protocol can 
become the basis for a standard inter-layer communication protocol in multi-layer organic 
systems. The design for sixteen protocol messages is listed in APPENDEX B. 
Within the autonomic computing context, golden elements which represent a single point of 
failure are not tolerable. However, eliminating them given the numerous probable fault scenarios 
is not possible. The existence of single points of failure in the system reduces its reliability and 
could jeopardize its chances to demonstrate its organic properties. Although golden elements 
cannot be eliminated from a given design, their effect can be minimized by minimizing their 
articulation probability. Such state can be achieved by creating a cross-monitoring capability 
among the system‟s golden elements. 
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In the organic systems generally, and in the organic architecture proposed herein specifically, the 
Autonomic Element is a golden element of which functionality cannot be restored upon failure. 
Therefore, and in order to build a highly sustainable organic system, the autonomically 
sustainable architecture described in this dissertation enables the cognitive layer to catch 
potential problems within the AEs and reconfigure with alternative bitstreams to work-around 
the issue.  
3.2.2. Intrinsic Evolutionary Repair Platform 
We have developed an intrinsic evolutionary repair platform in [40]. This platform is further 
tailored to run in partial reconfiguration mode and is integrated with the proposed organic 
system. This platform is triggered either externally by the Cognitive Layer or internally from 
within the Organic Layer itself to perform evolutionary repair. The developed platform consists 
of MRRA components that reside on the FPGA chip, and software components on the host PC, 
however, they are developed into layered modules that can be readily migrated to an on-chip 
general purpose microprocessor such as the IBM PowerPC available in commercial FPGAs. The 
main components of the platform are shown in Figure 8 as follows: 
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Figure 8. Intrinsic Evolution Platform 
JTAG Port: This is the standard JTAG (IEEE 1149.1) serial port for boundary scan and 
configuration operations. Its circuitry is implemented on the non-reconfigurable area of the 
Xilinx FGPA device and is embedded in most of the Xilinx Virtex and Spartan device families.  
GNAT: This is the General-purpose Native jtAg Tester component [81] which has been 
developed as part of the bitstream on the reconfigurable area of the chip. It connects to the JTAG 
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from one side and to the targeted circuit via a simple read/write bus interface. The bus width can 
be customized to match the circuit‟s peripherals.  
Evolved Circuit: This is the subject circuit to be evolved on the FPGA chip. The circuit 
peripherals are connected to the read/write bus of the GNAT to receive input signals and confer 
the corresponding output signals. The software components shown in Figure 8 are as follows: 
GA Engine: This is a C++ based console application implemented using an object oriented 
architecture. It contains classes which model the GA such as Individual and Generation classes 
along with the GA parameters such as the Mutation, Crossover, and Elitism rate. This module 
implements the conventional GA and is an independent component which can be replaced by any 
other enhanced algorithm variations. A conventional population-based GA was selected to 
demonstrate the applicability of the intrinsic genetic operators on the actual hardware. The 
handshaking between the GA Engine module and the Chromosome Manipulator module is done 
through a common data-structure that holds the genotype representation of the genetic 
individual. 
Chromosome Manipulator: This is a C-based library that contains the functional genetic 
operators performed on chromosomes along with fitness evaluation functions as follows: 
 GetConfiguration: Populates the chromosome‟s genotype representation data-structure 
from the configuration bitstream via the MRRA Module. 
59 
 PerformCrossover: Performs a probability-driven single point genetic crossover on the 
two parent chromosomes. Crossover point is randomly assigned for both parents 
according to a random number generator. The offspring yielded is loaded back to the 
calling GA Engine. 
 PerformPMX: Performs a probability-driven two-point genetic partially matched 
crossover (PMX) on the two parent chromosomes. Crossover points are randomly 
assigned for both parents according to a random number generator. The offspring inherits 
the chromosomal section between the two crossover points (Matching Section) from one 
parent and the rest of the chromosomal content is inherited from the other parent. The 
inheritance from the second parent is done in such a way that prevents any duplication of 
the same genetic material as shown in the example in Figure. 9. In this example, the 
rectangles in each chromosome represent the FPGA LUT‟s individual fields, and the 
number inside the rectangle denotes the logic configuration (the bit content that the LUT 
holds) assigned to that LUT. This number is assigned to the initial configuration of each 
LUT in order to keep track on that configuration during the evolution process and avoid 
its duplication.  PMX operator was originally designed for solving permutation problems 
such as the well known Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) [43, 82]. The cities in the 
TSP are analogous to the LUTs in this problem. Hence the PMX operator reorders the 
different configurations among the LUTs without duplicating the same configuration on 
multiple LUTs. This operator is more preservative to the genetic material of the 
chromosome than the conventional crossover, and therefore may find a faster 
functionality refurbishment by simply assigning the original configuration of a faulty 
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LUT to another unused one. This is especially true when a higher routing capability is 
achieved. The offspring yielded is loaded back to the calling GA Engine. 
 
 
Figure. 9. Partially Matched Crossover (PMX) 
 
 PerformOX: Performs a probability-driven two-point genetic Order Crossover (OX) on 
the two parent chromosomes. Crossover points are again randomly assigned for both 
parents according to a random number generator. One parent is selected and holes (i.e. 
LUTs with no assigned configurations) are assigned to the LUTs that hold the same 
Matching Section configurations of the other parent as shown in Figure 10b. Next, the 
configurations from the Matching Section taken from the first parent are assigned to the 
first LUTs from the left and the holes are then assigned to the contiguous LUTs as shown 
in Figure 10c. Holes are then filled with the matching section configurations from the 
other parent and the rest of the LUTs are assigned the rest of the left configurations as 
shown in Figure 10d. OX operator entails similar effect as the PMX however; it carries 
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out bigger shuffles in configurations across LUTs than the PMX does. Again, the 








b.) Insert Holes 
 
c.) Group Holes 
a.) Parent Chromosomes 
 
 d.) Assign Configurations to 
Holes 
Figure 10. Order Crossover (OX) 
 
 PerformCX: Performs a probability-driven genetic cycle crossover (CX) on the two 
parent chromosomes. No crossover points are assigned. Instead, LUT configurations 
taken from one parent are selected, and in the second phase the rest of the LUT 
configurations are inherited from the second parent.  In the example shown in Figure 11, 
and starting from the left hand side, the first configuration is assigned to the first LUT of 
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the offspring.  Then it continues by selecting the configuration number of the same LUT 
position in the second parent chromosome. The whole process continues until all the LUT 
configurations taken from the first parent are assigned as shown in Figure 11b.  In the 
second phase all the blank configurations are filled directly from the corresponding 
locations in the second parent as shown in Figure 11c. The offspring yielded is loaded 





b.) Configurations from Parent 1 
 
a.) Parent Chromosomes c.) Add Configurations from 
Parent 2 
Figure 11. Cycle Crossover (CX) 
 
 PerformMutation: Performs a probability-driven single-bit genetic mutation. A single bit 
of the binary chromosome content is flipped according to the mutation probability 
threshold value being exceeded by a random number generator on the interval [0,1]. 
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 ConfigureIndividual: Maps the chromosome‟s genotype representation back into its 
corresponding phenotype via the MRRA module.  It then opens the host PC parallel port 
and programs the FPGA device with the resultant bitstream via the JTAG port. 
 EvaluateInput: Receives the test input pattern from the GA Engine. The input pattern is 
then applied to the circuit on chip via the GNAT module. Once the output is evaluated, 
the Chromosome Manipulator module reads it and sends it back to the GA Engine for 
fitness assessment. 
In summary, the Chromosome Manipulator layer provides a logical abstraction of genetic 
operators to the GA Engine module.  This facilitates the integration of any GA at the top layer by 
making the hardware implementation details transparent. 
MRRA: This platform developed by our team is a Multilayer Runtime Reconfiguration 
Architecture for Autonomous Runtime Partial Reconfiguration of FPGA devices [39]. MRRA 
operations are partitioned into a Logic, Translation, and Reconfiguration layers along with a 
standardized set of Application Programming Interfaces 
Bitstream File: In the developed platform, an initial pre-compiled bitstream is generated using 
the Xilinx CAD tools. It contains the interconnected LUTs to be configured by the platform to 
evolve and realize an original circuit Design or restore functionality via Repair the functionality 
sought. The platform then manipulates this bitstream file to carry out the physical mapping of the 
crossover or mutation performed on the genotype representation. 
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The task-flow of the platform is divided into three phases:  
Initialization: This process aims at obtaining the configuration from the baseline bitstream file 
which has been manually designed using the Xilinx CAD tools. As depicted in Figure 12, the GA 
requests the genotype representation of the baseline configuration from the Chromosome 
Manipulator layer. As a result, the Chromosome Manipulator requests the LUTs configuration 
information from the bitstream file via the MRRA. The MRRA directly accesses the bitstream 
file and extracts the LUTs configuration information from the column-based vertical 
configuration frames using the Frame based Partial Reconfiguration Flow [39], and sends that 
information back to the Chromosome Manipulator. Finally, the Chromosome Manipulator layer 
restructures the bitstream data into the genotype data-structure mentioned earlier and sends it 
back to the GA Engine. 
GA Operations: Operations are performed by the Chromosome Manipulator module directly on 
the chromosome genotype. They are invoked by the GA Engine to supply the new generation 
with new individuals. When the GA Engine needs to execute a genetic operator such as the 
Crossover or Mutation, it calls the PerformCrossover, PerformPMX, PerformOX, PerformCX, or 
PerformMutation functions from the Chromosome Manipulator layer and passes the target 
chromosome(s) data-structure. The Chromosome Manipulator layer performs the operation 




Figure 12. Initialization: Obtain configuration from .bit File 
Fitness Evaluation which is carried out in two phases: FPGA Reconfiguration and Pattern 
Evaluation as shown in Figure 13. The FPGA Reconfiguration phase starts the moment the GA 
initiates the fitness evaluation process for an individual. The Chromosome Manipulator module 
issues a download command to the MRRA module. The MRRA writes-back the individual‟s 
physical representation to the bitstream file by directly manipulating the binary content of that 
file. The bit file is then downloaded to the FPGA via the JTAG port. 
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a.) FPGA Reconfiguration b.) Pattern Evaluation 
Figure 13. Fitness Evaluation: Performed in two phases a and b. 
On the other hand, the Pattern Evaluation phase starts by sending the input patterns serially to the 
FPGA chip via the JTAG according to the JTAG clock frequency. After that, the GNAT module 
groups back the serial bits of each input and applies them to the corresponding circuit‟s input 
ports. Having the circuit‟s output evaluated at the output ports, the GNAT sends it back to the 
MRRA via the JTAG which then passes it to the GA via the Chromosome Manipulator layer. 
A central modification to this platform might be to delegate the fitness evaluation process 
completely to the AE instead of shifting testing input patterns serially through the JTAG. The 
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moment the evolutionary repair is invoked at the Organic Layer, and each time a new individual 
is downloaded onto the FPGA by the means of the Partial Reconfiguraion for fitness evaluation, 
the AE evaluates its fitness under functional inputs while running in the TMR mode. The fitness 
of the under-repair FE is evaluated using the Voter Report over a customizable window of 
functional input evaluations. Doing so is expected to speed up the evolution and to eliminate the 
need to have exhaustive testing patterns for each function across the multiple OU. 
3.3. Summary 
In summary, an efficient architecture for an autonomous organic layer capable of demonstrating 
organic self-x properties including self-monitoring, self-reporting, and self-healing is presented. 
The proposed design is implementable on the commercially available FGPA devices which 
makes it a practically viable realization of the organic systems concepts. Moreover, an intrinsic 
evolutionary platform for digital circuit repair is proposed as an integrated means of autonomous 
organic system refurbishment. 
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CHAPTER 4: ORGANIC SELF-HEALING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In order to verify the applicability of the proposed architecture, and to identify the risks and 
limitations, the organic layer has been prototyped on the actual FPGA fabric. Limitations include 
the impact the AE imposes on the functional flow due to augmenting additional non-functional 
monitoring modules in the datapath, the system capability to gracefully switch between different 
modes according the health status, the Organic-Cognitive communication infrastructure, and 
many others. The Organic Unit prototype has been implemented with Sobel video edge-detection 
FE use-case, an image processing function commonly found on satellites. Moreover, the 
software-hardware communication designed protocol is verified along with a complete 
implementation of an intrinsic evolution platform for evolutionary refurbishment. 
4.1. Video Edge-Detection Use-Case on Organic Layer 
In order to test and demonstrate the Organic Unit capabilities, the Organic Unit architecture 
depicted in Figure 7 was implemented on XC4VSX35 FPGA on Xilinx Virtex-4 Video Starter 
Kit. A Sobel 2-D spatial gradient measurement video edge-detector was implemented as the 
organic FE. Sobel algorithm was selected because of its simplicity compared to the other 
advanced edge-detection techniques. 
The developed Organic Unit prototype supports the following RARS features: 
 Duplex mode (2 FEs online, 1 FE standby). 
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 Discrepancy-based error detection. 
 TMR mode (3 FEs online, Voter enabled). 
 FE health status reporting. 
 Fault detection and refurbishment with duplex mode restoration. 
 Message-based inter-layer communication modules. 
The communication protocol Experiments have shown that a transmission rate of 5mbps is 
achievable using the Xilinx Parallel Cable 4. Due to the relatively small protocol message length 
(typically 16-bit), the system can handle more than 300,000 messages per second per FPGA 
board. Hence no communication bandwidth congestion is expected. 
The use-case diagram is shown in Figure 14. The Video Source block is a regular personal 
computer running a pre-recorded video and thus providing the video stream through its VGA-
OUT port which is connected to the VGA-IN port on the FPGA board via a standard 15-pin 
VGA cable. Alternatively, a camcorder capturing live video can be used instead. The video 
stream is captured and buffered by the VGA-IN module on frame basis. The edge-detected frame 
produced by the FEs is sent to the AE and then is buffered and finally sent out to the target 
monitor denoted by the Monitor block connected to the VGA output port of the FPGA board via 
a standard 15-pin VGA cable. Communication with the Cognitive Layer is carried out through 
the Dispatcher module which is connected to the PC running the cognitive Layer software 
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through the on-board JTAG port using Xilinx Parallel Cable IV. The status of each FE is also 
encoded and is displayed using two on-board LEDs. The possible statuses are: online and 
healthy, online and faulty, offline and healthy, and offline and faulty. Similarly, the Voter report 
is also encoded and is displayed using three LEDs. The possible report messages are: no 
discrepancy, FE1 discrepant, FE2 discrepant, FE3 discrepant, all discrepant, and Voter disabled 



























Figure 14. Video edge-detection use-case. 
Fault Injection is done by introducing stuck-at one or stuck-at zero faults at an LUT output. 
Special HDL was developed to define the location of the fault and its type (0 or 1) for each FE at 
design-time. On board DIP switches are used for run-time fault injection into any of the three 
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FEs selectively; it is also used to enable/disable the AE activities. DIP switch configurations are 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Fault Injection DIP Switches 
DIP Purpose 
1 
When asserted, the organic activities are turned on. When de-asserted only functional 
behavior is demonstrated. (for malfunction visibility to the human-eye) 
2 Stuck-at fault injected in FE1 
3 Stuck-at fault injected in FE2 
4 Stuck-at fault injected in FE3 
The place-and-routed design of the use-case on the FPGA fabric is shown in Figure 15. The 
figure shows each FE implemented in its own Partial Reconfiguration (PR) and all FEs are 
plugged into the final OU by the means of the Bus-Macros technique.  
 
Figure 15. FE-PR and Entire OU on FPGA Fabric 
Several scenarios were conducted to test the capability of the platform to accommodate and 
circumvent system failures. These scenarios are listed in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Use-case Testing Scenarios 
Scenario 1: Fault Free 
As indicated in the Cognitive Layer screenshot below, the system runs in duplex mode, 
where two FEs are running the edge-detection algorithm and the third one is in „cold 
standby‟ inactive mode. The system performance is at 100%. The edge detected image 
is shown in Figure 16-A. 
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Scenario-2: Fault injection (Single Faulty FE) 
The system runs in duplex mode. DIP-switch 1 is ON, indicating that the AE is enabled 
monitoring faults in the FES. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned ON. The 
edge detected image in Figure 16-A shows NO faulty pixels and the quality of the 
image remains the same, this is due to the AE intervention which can be summarized as 
the following: 
o AE detects discrepancy between FE1 and FE2.  
o AE enables FE3 and changes its status from Offline to Online. It also enables the 
Voter (TMR).  
o Voter identifies FE1 as the culprit and its status becomes (Online and faulty) 
o The output is streamed out from the majority vote result and hence no degradation 
happens to the detected image. 
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Scenario-3: Fault injection (Two Faulty FEs) 
Starting from Scenario-2 last step, DIP-switch 3 (FE-2 fault injection) is turned ON. 
The voter reports discrepant outputs of the three FEs. Nevertheless, the voter is 
intelligent enough to discern the pristine FE. This is done by keeping history of 
successful voting epochs. Pristine FE is the one that always voted correctly. The 
detected image quality deteriorates as shown in Figure 16-B. It can be seen that 
reasonable performance (81%) is still achievable with two defective FEs. 
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Scenario-4: Fault injection (Three Faulty FEs) 
Starting from Scenario-3 last step, DIP-switch 4 (FE-3 fault injection) is turned ON. 
The voter reports discrepant outputs of the three FEs. The voter reports three defective 
FEs. 
 
Figure 17 shows the organic layer state transitions flowchart. The sequence of events, status, and 
actions that controls the organic behavior discussed earlier is depicted. 
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Figure 17. Self-Repair Flow Diagram 
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4.2. Evolutionary Design and Repair Platform 
As mentioned earlier, the organic system exploits the intrinsic evolutionary approach as a 
legitimate highly flexible technique to achieve functionality regain. For that, several experiments 
were performed to verify the platform‟s evolution capability. The circuit used to demonstrate the 
platform workflow is a 4-bit arithmetic adder. It provides a tractable circuit for the GA to evolve 
that exhibits characteristics for large arithmetic circuits including a variable amount of 
redundancy and combinational logic behavior. The GA parameters used throughout the 
experiments are shown in able 6.  A total of 8 LUTs were used in the design experiments. This 
number was increased to 13 LUTs in the repair experiment to add a redundancy margin for the 
GA to evolve within. All GA parameters were extracted by running extrinsic evolution of the GA 
and finding out the optimal values. The table shows the range of tested values for each parameter 
along with the optimal one. Population sizes between 5 and 20 were evaluated and best results 
were achieved using population size of 10. Crossover rates in the range of 30% to 90% in 
increments of 10% were evaluated indicating the GA performed well when the value was near 
60%. Therefore, a rate of 60% was used for the four different types of crossover used in the 
experiments: Single-Point crossover, PMX, OX, and CX. Similar analysis was used to determine 
baseline values for the other parameters summarized in able 6. 
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Table 6. GA Parameters 
Parameter Range Evaluated Value Selected 
Number of LUTs for design 8 8 
Number of LUTs for repair 8-13 13 
Population Size 5-20 10 
Mutation Rate 5%-90% 50% 
Crossover Rate 30%-90% 60% 
Tournament Size 1-8 6 
Elitism Size 1-2 1 
There are three types of experiments performed as follows: 
 
 Unseeded Design: In this experiment, the GA evolved the 4-bit adder circuit with only a 
randomly-seeded initial population. The purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate the 
capability to intrinsically evolve 100% functional circuits starting from a random bitstream. A 
baseline bitstream was generated manually using Xilinx ISE Project Navigator. This bitstream 
contains the 8 interconnected LUTs on which the circuit is to be evolved along with the GNAT 
core connected to the JTAG component. 
Seeded Design: In this experiment, the GA evolved the 4-bit adder circuit starting with a 
population of partially functional seeded individuals in addition to completely random ones. The 
partially functional seeds were originally fully functional designs which were altered by 
deliberately exposing them to mutation operator. This arrangement emulates a fault-scenario in 
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real life avionics in which the configuration bitstream is partially affected by Single Event Upset 
(SEU) due to radiation burst or any other severe environmental event. Typically, scrubbing is 
used to replace bitstream with an intact version stored on nonvolatile storage. However, this 
experiment could operate even in the event of permanent damage to the underlying fabric and 
with the absence of intact stored baseline configuration for scrubbing. 
Repair: A single stuck-at fault was adopted as a case study to show the capability of the 
platform to repair a faulty circuit. Two aspects should be highlighted here: 
I. Fault Injection: Since an actual fault can neither be readily nor precisely introduced into 
the device, the circuit is stimulated to behave as if the fault actually exists. This technique 
becomes more complicated considering the fact that the platform allows only functional 
logic manipulation without the possibility of altering the device interconnects. Hence, the 
bitstream was processed directly before configuring the device to modify the contents of 
one LUT so that it behaves as if a stuck-at fault is present. Alternatively, in the Sobel 
Edge-detector use-case, special logic was implemented to control fault injection through 
on-board DIP switches as described in the previous section. 
II. Degree of Redundancy: During the initial runs, the GA failed to achieve complete repair. 
It turned out that the search space given to the GA was exceedingly narrow, and 
consequently, the GA failed to avoid the faulty resource by constructing alternative paths. 
To remedy this limitation, redundancy was introduced by adding extra unused LUTs to 
the original design.  This was performed within the standard partial reconfiguration flow 
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presented by Xilinx [83] which has a module-level granularity that requires each module 
to be arranged at slice column level with a four-slice boundary requirement.  A bus macro 
is also required to establish a communication means amongst modules. Besides the 
restricted flexibility due to the coarse granularity, this module-based partial 
reconfiguration flow can only be controlled at a very high level during design time. 
Hence, mostly depending on the Xilinx tool sets to interpret the placement and routing 
process, which may encounter some illegal implementations especially when the partial 
configuration module‟s size requires extensive routing resources. 
For the four aforementioned crossover operators, each combined with the mutation operator; five 
intrinsic evolutions were achieved for each of the three experiments: the unseeded, seeded, and 
repair using the presented platform. The GA parameters listed in able 6 were used. The following 
aspects were measured to quantify the capability of the platform to carry out the evolution 
process: 
maxF : The numerical measure of the fitness for the best individual of the final generation of the 
run. The maximum fitness for the 4-Bit adder is calculated as shown in Eq. 1. 
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finalF : The arithmetic mean for the fitness of all the individuals in the final generation of the run. 
G : The total number of generation evolved during the run. 
Timing Information: The timing information for each run and is divided into four metrics:  
totalCM : The time elapsed to perform the GA crossover and mutation during the entire run. 
FE : The time elapsed to apply the input patterns and read back the corresponding outputs for 
all the fitness evaluations during the entire run. 
C : The average time taken by a single genetic crossover for a certain GA run. The crossover 
could be a single point conventional crossover, PMX, OX, or CX. 
M : The average time taken by a single genetic mutation for a certain GA run. 
Experimental results are listed in Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11. It can be seen from 
the results that the intrinsic GA operators‟ time is in the range of the micro-seconds. Operators‟ 
time is small compared to the fitness measurement time which is around one millisecond for 
each pattern evaluation. In this dissertation the JTAG serial port is used which imposes a 
substantial time delay that reaches up to 22 seconds to configure the entire device using the 
Xilinx Parallel Cable III which is reduced to 1 second using the Xilinx Parallel Cable IV. This 
performance overhead can be considerably reduced if other interfaces are used such as the 
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SelectMap parallel port or the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP) on a System-on-Chip 
(SoC) implementation using the IBM PowerPC on-chip processor. 
Device programming time is high due to two main reasons; the first one is the fact that the JTAG 
port was used to download the bitstream to the chip. Theoretically, the JTAG interface with the 
Parallel Cable III has a maximum download speed of 300Kbps [84]. The measured data transfer 
rate using JTAG in our experiments was 205Kbps because of the data transfer overhead between 
the host PC and the board. On the other hand, with the Parallel Cable IV which has a maximum 
download speed of 5Mbps [84], a 4.28Mbps average data transfer rate was measured in our 
experiments, again due to the data transfer overhead between the PC and the board. 
Alternatively, the SelectMap interface with Xilinx Virtex device family can work at a maximum 
of 66MHz clock speed loading one byte per clock cycle, i.e. 528Mbps [85]. Hence the device 
programming time can reach as low as 8 milliseconds if the SelectMap is used. 
The second reason is due to the large bitstream file used of 548Kbytes. The partial configuration 
bitstream file for the 4-Bit adder circuit along with the GNAT component is only 80Kbyte. When 
this file is used instead of the full configuration bitstream the device programming time is 
drastically reduced to 16 milliseconds using the JTAG with Xilinx Parallel Cable IV and to 150 
microseconds using the SelectMap interface. Comparison between configuration times using the 
different schemes is shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Sobel Edge-detector Configuration Times in Various Technologies 
Approach Virtex-2 [86] Virtex-4 Full Virtex-4 Partial 
Device Virtex-II Virtex-4 Virtex-4 
Bitstream Size 548 KB 1.633 MB 30.61 KB 
JTAG Cable 
parallel cable III 
300Kbps 
parallel cable IV 
5Mbps 
parallel cable IV 
5Mbps 
Config time (msec) 22000 2613 48 
 
In Table 8, the timing measurement of the probability-driven single point crossover and mutation 
operators for each run is listed. Similarly, Table 9 lists the experimental results of the 
probability-driven PMX and mutation operators for each run. On the other hand, Table 10 lists 
the experimental results of the probability-driven OX and mutation operators for each run, and 
finally, Table 11 lists the experimental results of the probability-driven CX and mutation 
operators for each run. 
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maxF  finalF  G  
Timing Information 
(seconds) 
totalCM  FE  C  M  
Unseeded 
1 1280 1265 185 1.147 472 4.158 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6 
2 1280 1260 207 1.326 161 4.302 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1254 63 0.417 362 4.265 x 10
-6
 0.49 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1254 142 0.884 311 4.274 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1254 122 0.766 117 4.225 x 10
-6




1 1280 1263 46 0.296 263 4.115 x 10
-6
 0.44 x 10
-6
 
2 1280 1265 103 0.651 36 4.199 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1247 14 0.091 97 4.153 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1254 38 0.234 186 4.291 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1254 73 0.472 428 4.361 x 10
-6




1 1280 1270 168 1.059 260 4.208 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
2 1280 1265 102 0.609 638 4.317 x 10
-6
 0.51  x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1265 250 1.568 240 4.342 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1260 94 0.603 408 4.299 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1263 160 1.021 161 4.152 x 10
-6










maxF  finalF  G  
Timing Information 
(seconds) 
totalCM  FE  C  M  
Unseeded 
1 1280 1255 258 5.44 x 10
-3
 660 3.13 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6 
2 1280 1244 119 2.58 x 10
-3
 312 3.22 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1260 109 2.3 x 10
-3
 280 3.11 x 10
-6
 0.49 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1258 189 3.95 x 10
-3
 490 3.1 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1254 85 1.78 x 10
-3
 223 3.13 x 10
-6




1 1280 1265 232 4.86 x 10
-3 
589 3.11 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6 
2 1280 1247 140 2.94 x 10
-3
 359 3.1 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1254 238 5 x 10
-3
 618 3.12 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1251 56 1.16 x 10
-3
 148 3.02 x 10
-6
 0.5 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1254 128 2.72 x 10
-3
 336 3.15 x 10
-6




1 1280 1246 430 8.95 x 10
-3
 1067 3.06 x 10
-6
 0.49 x 10-
6
 
2 1280 1257 126 2.65 x 10
-3
 323 3.16 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1265 239 5.03 x 10
-3
 620 3.12 x 10
-6
 0.45 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1241 182 3.81 x 10
-3
 493 3.05 x 10
-6
 0.53 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1239 145 3.03 x 10
-3
 372 3.09 x 10
-6










maxF  finalF  G  
Timing Information 
(seconds) 
totalCM  FE  C  M  
Unseeded 
1 1280 1247 546 11.9 x 10
-3
 1341 3.15 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6 
2 1280 1236 253 5.61 x 10
-3
 656 3.22 x 10
-6
 0.57 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1218 312 6.64 x 10
-3
 784 3.16 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1005 485 10.4 x 10
-3
 1244 3.2 x 10
-6
 0.48 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1113 764 16.2 x 10
-3
 1982 3.14 x 10
-6




1 1280 1138 319 6.78 x 10
-3
 810 3.15 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
2 1264 1177 1000 21.4 x 10
-3
 2484 3.18 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1254 627 13.3 x 10
-3
 1609 3.14 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1253 422 8.95 x 10
-3
 1036 3.15 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1244 461 9.78 x 10
-3
 1184 3.16 x 10
-6




1 1280 816 677 15 x 10
-3
 1700 3.3 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
2 1264 805 1000 21.2 x 10
-3
 2566 3.14 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1037 533 11.3 x 10
-3
 1323 3.15 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
4 1276 879 1000 21.4 x 10
-3
 2539 3.17 x 10
-6
 0.48 x 10
-6
 
5 1274 943 1000 21.3 x 10
-3
 2511 3.14 x 10
-6






Table 11. Experimental Results Summary for CX and Mutation 
Experiment Type Run 
maxF  finalF  G  
Timing Information 
(seconds) 
totalCM  FE  C  M  
Unseeded 
1 1280 1244 137 2.61 x 10
-3
 352 2.79 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
2 1280 1265 448 8.72 x 10
-3
 1113 2.85 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1265 373 7.2 x 10
-3
 958 2.83 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1046 293 5.67 x 10
-3
 728 2.84 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1252 205 4.02 x 10
-3
 526 2.83 x 10
-6




1 1280 1248 289 5.61 x 10
-3
 717 2.85 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
2 1280 1252 178 3.45 x 10
-3
 462 2.84 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1254 199 4.22 x 10
-3
 494 3.14 x 10
-6
 0.53 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1265 292 5.7 x 10
-3
 741 2.87 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1260 258 5 x 10
-3
 648 2.85 x 10
-6




1 1280 1267 403 7.77 x 10
-3
 1057 2.83 x 10
-6
 0.47 x 10
-6
 
2 1280 1266 169 3.5 x 10
-3
 420 3.07 x 10
-6
 0.46 x 10
-6
 
3 1280 1236 43 0.82 x 10
-3
 110 2.79 x 10
-6
 0.51 x 10
-6
 
4 1280 1265 125 2.55 x 10
-3
 310 3.0 x 10
-6
 0.48 x 10
-6
 
5 1280 1264 101 1.92 x 10
-3
 259 2.78 x 10
-6




While the conventional single point crossover favors the genetic material that yields high fitness 
and opts to find higher fitness offspring by propagating this material regardless of its 
chromosomal position to the next generation, the other ordering crossover operators such as the 
PMX, OX, and CX favor the combination of certain genetic material used in a certain 
chromosomal position that yields high fitness and proceed to finding higher fitness individuals 
by propagating that combination to the offspring. This kind of behavior leads to a finer grained 
of search which may increase the GA time to converge into a solution as can be seen from the 
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experimental results.  It has more potential, however, to find higher quality solutions than the 
conventional crossover. This explains why the number of generations needed to reach full fitness 
using the conventional crossover has proved to be the fastest among the rest of the crossover 
types in the three experiments unseeded design, seeded design, and repair. 
In order to estimate the robustness and overall performance of each candidate chromosomes, 
fitness evaluation needs to be carried out at the end of each generation. For a full set of hardware 
testing vectors, its size is directly related to the total number of input bits of the testing module. 
Since for a hardware bit the input will be always „0‟ or „1‟, the total possible input vector 
combination will be l2 , where l is the bit width of the total inputs. Hence the time complexity of 
the fitness evaluation per generation will be O(p* l2 ), where p is the population size of the 
generation. 
To measure the exact time the mutation and crossover operations take, another experiment was 
carried out by setting the mutation and crossover rates to 100% to ensure that the operators are 
performed with certainty. This allowed measurement of the time for each operation individually. 
The results of this experiment and similar experiments using Xilinx design tool driven flow and 
using JBITs are listed in Table 12. It can be seen from the results that more than seven orders of 
magnitude enhancement over Xilinx design tool driven flow and three orders of magnitude 
enhancement over JBITs was achieved by the developed platform. 
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Table 12. GA Operators Timing  (seconds) 
This Platform Xilinx Tool Flow JBITS 
C   M   C   M   C   M   
4 x 10-6 0.5 x 10-6 12.56 9.9 4.8 x 10-3 4.6 x 10-3 
 
It can also be seen from the results that the conventional single point crossover takes the highest 
time amongst the other crossover types which is around 4.2 microseconds. On the other hand, the 
PMX and the OX require equal time around 3.1 microseconds, while the CX requires the least 
amount of time around 2.8 microseconds. It is very intuitive that the CX operator takes less time 
than the others as it has no crossover points to choose and consequently has only one algorithmic 
loop that produces the whole offspring chromosome. On the other hand, the other operators have 
to randomly assign crossover points and treat every part of the broken chromosomes in a 
different way which requires more time.  Figure 18 shows five runs that demonstrate the 
capability of the platform to evolve to fully working 4-Bit adder designs starting from scratch. 
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Figure 19. Seeded Design GA Runs 
Figure 19 shows five runs where a fully working 4-Bit adder was designed from a partially 
working seed. Five different seeds were used in the five runs. 
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Figure 20 shows five runs in which the platform was used to repair the broken 4-Bit adder. A 
stuck-at zero fault was randomly injected in the first input pin of the third LUT of the original 
design. The fault injected reduces the circuit‟s fitness to 1152 out-of 1280. The fastest run was 
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Figure 20. Repair GA Runs 
Figure 21 shows the GA evolution progress of the organic Sobel video edge-detector 
refurbishment using the developed intrinsic repair platform. The edge-detector was hit by a 
stuck-at one fault in an LUT output port that caused its fitness to drop from 2048 down to 1178 
or 57%. As can be seen from the figure, the platform was able to achieve a refurbishment quality 
of 88% in as few as 20 generations. In excess of 300 generations were needed to evolve the 
remaining 12%. This behavior of fast fitness ramp-up in the early stages of the evolution process 
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Figure 21. Sobel Edge-Detector Refurbishment Evolution Progress 
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CHAPTER 5: CGT-PRUNED REPAIR TECHNIQUE 
Knowledge regarding the location of hardware resource faults guides the GA search process to 
converge to complete repair in fewer generations than when the knowledge is unavailable. In 
particular, information regarding the location of the fault effectively reduces the search space.  
The GA can also avoid creating and analyzing solutions that use the suspected faulty resource.  
Information regarding the location of the fault can be obtained using a Combinatorial Group 
Testing (CGT) [87] based fault location algorithms. 
Formally, the CGT problem is defined as that of identifying a subset of d defectives from a set of 
n items.  Items can be sampled, and subset of items, known as groups can be tested to identify 
the presence of defectives.  Group testing techniques have been used in medical, chemical, and 
electrical testing, coding, drug screening, pollution control, multi-access channel management, 
and recently in data verification, clone library screening and blood testing.  The fault location 
problem in FPGA logic elements closely approximates the generic group testing problem.  A set 
of functionally-identical but physically-distinct configurations provide the groups, and evaluation 
of the outputs provides the tests for the identification of defectives in the groups-under-test.  The 
accumulated correctness behavior of resources can be used to locate the physical resource fault.  
Once sufficient information is obtained regarding the location of the physical fault, it is passed 
on to the GA which can use the information to identify a refurbished solution. 
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5.1. Group Testing Based Fault Location Procedure 
CGT algorithms are a class of solutions to the problem of identifying individual defective 
members from a large population by conducting a minimal number of tests on sub-groups or 
blocks of elements.  The fault-location algorithm used in this dissertation is obtained from the 
Dueling with Modified Halving algorithm described in [31]. 
In this algorithm individual configurations are evaluated based on their output to identify 
discrepancies between the expected output and the observed output.  The presence of an output 
discrepancy implies that the resources used by the configuration are suspect of being fault-
affected.  The set of all competing configurations is represented by S.  Each competing 
configuration k, 1 < k <  |S| has a unique binary Usage Matrix Uk, 1 < k  < p, with elements 
Uk[i,j],  1 < i  < m, 1 < j < n, where m and n represent the rows and columns in the device layout 
respectively.  Elements Uk[i,j] = 1 denote the usage of resource (i, j) by configuration k.  
Discrepant outputs lead to a unit increment in the value of all H[i,j] where Uk[i,j] = 1.  The 
History Matrix H, with elements H[i,j] 1 < i  < m, 1 < j  < n, is an integer matrix used to 
represent the relative fitness of individual resources.  In case of a single fault, fault location is 
complete when a single element in H has the maximum value in H.   The output of the fault 
location procedure is the coordinates of the suspected-faulty resources.  The CGT-pruned GA 
presented in this dissertation utilizes the output from the fault location procedure to avoid the 
suspected faulty resource during the process of searching for alternate solutions. 
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5.2. CGT-Pruned Expedited Genetic Algorithm 
The CGT-pruned GA presented in this dissertation utilizes resource performance information 
obtained by using combinatorial group testing techniques.  This information is incorporated 
within the GA to evolve faster refurbishment and consequently yield higher availability.  In order 
to assess the advantages of the CGT-pruned genetic algorithms over previous methods, a 
simulator was created.  The architecture of this simulator is shown in Figure 22. 
 
 
Figure 22. Genetic Algorithm Simulator 
 
The simulator is a C++ based console application that consists of two main components: the 
CGT procedure and the GA.  The CGT algorithm uses the GNU Scientific Library (GSL) and 
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simulates the fault location method. The GA is implemented using an object oriented architecture 
that contains classes which model the FPGA resources with flexible geometries such as the 
Configurable Logic Block (CLB) and Look-Up Table (LUT) classes, and others that model the 
GA such as Individual and Generation classes.  When this simulator is run in the CGT-pruned 
GA mode, the CGT component simulates the desired FPGA chip and obtains resource 
performance information which is an input to the GA.  The GA then performs evolutionary 
design or reads the Seed Configuration file and performs evolutionary repair according to the 
active mode of operation.  In the Conventional GA mode, the CGT component is not invoked and 
no resource performance information is available to the GA. The simulator has three input files 
as follows: 
Settings: This file contains all the parameterized settings that control the way the simulator works 
such as the geometry of the simulated FPGA chip, GA settings such as the population size and 
crossover rate, and the mode of operation. 
Truth Table: This file contains the input/output truth table for the circuit under evolution.  This 
describes the desired behavior of a fully-fit configuration and is used to evaluate the correctness 
of the simulated circuit‟s outputs.  
Seed Configuration: This file contains the bitstream representation of the initial configuration 
that the GA should start with in case of repair, i.e. the faulty design that is sought to be repaired.  
This file is not required in the design mode of operation. 
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The following two output files are produced by the simulator: 
Fitness Report: This file contains the history of each generation of the GA process, detailing the 
maximum fitness of its best individual and its average fitness. 
Best Configuration: This file contains the bitstream representation of the configuration with the 
highest fitness the GA could evolve at the end of the run. 
5.3. Experiments 
Three experiments, each targeting a different problem, were conducted to analyze differences 
between the CGT-pruned GA and conventional GAs. The first involved comparing the 
performance of the two for repair. In the second, the CGT-pruned GA was enhanced using the 
cell-swapping operator. The third experiment quantifies the differences in performance of the 
two for the problem of designing configurations from scratch.  Also, by comparing results from 
the refurbishment and the design problem, the hypothesis that the repair problem is more 
tractable than the design problem can be verified. 
Figure 23 shows two configurations on an FPGA, where the dark squares represent resources 
currently used by the configuration and the light squares represent the unused resources.  The 
configuration shown on the left utilizes a resource that has been affected by a fault.  This 
suspected faulty resource that has been identified using the CGT algorithm is indicated by a 
cross.  In the CGT-pruned genetic algorithm, the faulty resource is isolated and is no longer 
regarded in the genetic operations that evolve a repair.  Thus, all the faulty configurations which 
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involve the faulty resource will be avoided.  The crossover and mutation operators are used by 
the GA to modify the bitstring representation of the FPGA configurations.  Crossover points can 
only occur on the CLB boundaries to prevent destructive intra-CLB crossover.  The mutation 
operator is defined as probabilistic inversions of bits in the bitstring.  A mutation might change 




Figure 23. CGT-pruned Genetic Algorithm Repair 
A total of 120 experiments were conducted to explore the advantage of the CGT-pruned genetic 
algorithms in both repair and design problems in the presence of a randomly inject single stuck at 
one fault on the input of an LUT.  Results have shown that CGT-pruned GA yields faster 
evolved solution for both cases. 
In all the experiments, the circuit evolved was a 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier which is a tractable 
circuit size for the GA to evolve. 
 
100 
Table 13. GA Parameters 
CLBs 15 
LUTs/CLB 4 
Population Size 25 
Mutation Rate 0.05 
Crossover Rate 0.4 
Tournament Size 6 
Elitism 2 
 
The parameters shown in Table 13 were used in all the experiments.  The GA parameters were 
obtained by varying the parameters to optimize performance.  Elitism, wherein two best-fit 
individuals are carried forward to the next generation without any genetic modification, is used 
to increase continuation of enhancements realized by the GA.  A low crossover rate of 0.4 was 
chosen since it was observed that higher values were too disruptive to the exploration of alternate 
configurations. 
Four types of experiments were conducted, and for each type, 30 identical experiments were 
carried out to ensure statistical significance.  In the first experiment, the multiplier was evolved 
from scratch in the presence of fault using conventional GA. The same experiment was then 
repeated using the CGT-pruned GA in the place of the conventional GA. In the repair 
experiments, the multiplier was repaired using the conventional GA, and then again using the 
CGT-pruned GA. 
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The simulated FPGA geometry through all the 120 different experiments has 15 Configurable 
Logic Blocks (CLBs) with each CLB containing four Look Up Tables (LUTs).  Each LUT has 
two inputs and one output which in turn can be configured to realize one of the OR, AND, NOR, 
NAND, NOT, and XOR basic logic functions.  The interconnect follows a strict Feed-Forward 
topology architecture.  The LUTs are numbered sequentially with the lowest numbers being 
connected to the inputs.  The output of LUTs with higher index numbers cannot be the inputs of 
LUTs with numbers lower than them as described in [17].  The fault simulated in the 
experiments was a single functional logic fault in one of the LUTs. 
5.4. Results and Analysis 
5.4.1. Fault Location Using CGT Algorithm 
In experiments involving the CGT-pruned GAs, fault location information was gained by using 
the CGT algorithm.  The CGT algorithm used a simulated array of 15 CLBs, with 4 LUTs in 
each CLB.  Thus each Usage Matrix, Uk has 60 elements. A single functional fault was simulated 
in one of the 60 LUTs on the simulated FPGA.  On average, over a set of 30 fault-isolation 
simulations, the procedure required only 12 evaluations to correctly identify the location of the 
fault, as denoted by a single element with the maximum value in the H matrix.  The number of 
evaluations required by the fault-location algorithm is as low as 0.02% of the average number of 
generations required by the GA to design the circuit, and 0.11% of the average number of 
generations CGT-pruned GA takes to realize a complete refurbishment.  Thus, the isolation 
102 
procedure imposes a very low temporal overhead in exchange for the speedup obtained in the 
refurbishment process. 
5.4.2. Design in the Presence of Fault 
A 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier was designed in the presence of a faulty LUT by a conventional GA 
and the CGT-pruned GA.  The results are listed in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Design of a 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier in the Presence of a Fault 
Experiment Type Conventional design CGT-pruned design 
Circuit 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier 
Number of Experiments 30 30 
Arithmetic Mean (Generations) 64500  53900  
Standard Deviation 36000 37300 
Standard Error of the Mean 7200 7450 
68% Confidence Interval [57300 → 71700] [46450 → 61350] 
 
The experimental results listed in Table 14 show that the CGT-pruned GA yields a complete 
design after an average of 53,900 generations as opposed to the 64,500 generations required by 
the conventional GA.  However, this enhancement is not consistently substantial as shown by the 
relatively standard deviations.  
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5.4.3. Repair 
This experiment analyzes the effect of incorporating resource performance information in the 
GA for evolutionary repair.  The results are listed in Table 15. 
Table 15. Repair of a 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier 
Experiment Type Conventional Repair CGT-pruned Repair 
Circuit 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier 3-bit x 2-bit Multiplier 
Number of Experiments 30 30 
Arithmetic Mean (Generations) 17150 10700  
Standard Deviation 15650 12550 
Standard Error of the Mean 2850 2300 
68% Confidence Interval [14300 → 20000] [8400 → 13000] 
  
From Table 15, and as shown in Figure 24, it is seen that the CGT-pruned GA yields 
substantially faster repair than the conventional GA.  Again the range of the actual mean for a 
high confidence level is still wide, yet not as wide as in the design case.  Since GAs in general 
have a probabilistic nature, the standard deviation is large which in turn widens the range of 
possible values the actual mean could fall within.  The standard error of the mean can be reduced 
by increasing the number of experiments conducted.  The 68% confidence interval ranges for the 
conventional and the CGT-pruned GAs do not intersect in the repair experiment which makes the 
results more statistically significant. 
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Figure 24. Repair Progress: CGT-pruned  vs. Conventional GA  
Figure 25 compares the performance of the CGT-Pruned GA with that of a conventional GA for 
the 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier repair experiments.  In experiment 15, the CGT-pruned GA requires 
only 526 generations to realize a complete refurbishment, as opposed to the 66,735 required by 
the conventional GA, which corresponds to a 99.2% reduction. However, in about one third of 
the experiments, the CGT-pruned GA does not always outperform the conventional GA. For 
example, in experiment 25, the conventional GA performs the CGT-pruned GA by refurbishing 
the faulty configuration in 76.76% fewer generations.  As listed in Table 15, on average, the 
CGT-pruned GA requires 10,700 generations as opposed to the 17,150 generations required by 
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the conventional GA to realize complete configuration refurbishment.  This confirms Hypothesis 
1 at a 68% confidence level.  
 




Figure 26. Three Fast Runs of the CGT-pruned GA Repair  
Figure 26 shows repair progress of three runs which achieved repair within 1,200 generations, 
where a maximum fitness of 160 is attained at the end of 512 generations in the best case.  It can 
be seen in general that the GA evolves to a relatively very high fitness within the first few 
hundreds of generations, but it takes it significantly more generations to reach the maximum 
fitness. 
In addition to the 3-bit x 2-bit multiplier, a 2-to-4 decoder was also designed and repaired using 
the CGT-pruned GA.  The experimental results show that the CGT-pruned GA yields a complete 
design after an average of 152 generations as opposed to the 220 generations required by the 
conventional GA.  In the refurbishment experiments, the CGT-pruned GA converges to a 
107 
complete repair in 70 generations on an average, as compared to the 102 generations required by 
the conventional GA. 
Experiments have quantified the benefit of the CGT-pruned genetic algorithm which yields a 
completely refurbished FPGA configuration in 37.6% fewer generations on average than a 
conventional GA.  The CGT-pruned genetic algorithm is approximately 16% faster in the case of 
designing in the presence of a fault.  Benefits of the CGT-pruned GA are more pronounced in 
repair than in design.  This is related to the fact that the search space is reduced by eliminating 
faulty FPGA logic resources from the pool of unused resources in the case of repair. 
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CHAPTER 6: A NOVEL FRAMEWORK FOR MISSION 
SUSTAINABILITY 
As discussed in Chapter 1, sustainability is the core target of the organically computing research. 
It has become very imperative to build a mathematical model to quantify this property. In this 
chapter, a thorough sustainability analysis is conducted and a mathematical representation is 
derived to quantify system‟s sustainability property. 
6.1. Sustainability Model 
Figure 27 depicts the black-box diagram view of the sustainability model presented in this 
dissertation. The first input is the design resource information. It provides details of the design 
FPGA resources which are subject to the faults considered in the analysis. The second input is 
the distribution of each fault that might affect the mission.  The third input is the repair policy 
information. It includes parameters such as detection and refurbishment latencies and 
depreciation. The fourth input is the Availability threshold which represents the minimum 
availability level below which the mission fails. The last input is the mission duration. The 
outcome from the model is the quantity of unutilized reconfigurable resources, referred to the 
size of the ARP introduced in Chapter 1, which need to be budgeted for in order for the subject 
design to sustain its mission lifetime. Additionally, the model shows the maximum duration the 
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Figure 27. Sustainability Model Functional Block Diagram 
As depicted in the diagram in Figure 27, Sustainability is acquired for a predetermined system 
lifetime interval, opposite to the traditional unbounded perception of the term. Moreover, 
Sustainability herein is not a number or a percentage associated with the system capability to 
survive. The system cannot, for example be 70% sustainable, since that does not correspond to 
any real-world condition. When planning a deployment in fault prone environment, the system 
either overcomes all the failures throughout its mission lifetime, and hence remain sustainable, 
or else it fails to maintain its minimum level of acceptable performance upon faults and as a 
result be unsustainable.  
It is important to note that the class of systems considered in this analysis is the non-reproducing 
closed system. An electronic system is a system that has a fixed number of physical resources 
identified at design time. These resources cannot reproduce or regenerate and likewise, cannot 
emigrate from or to other systems outside the system‟s boundary. System resources include all 
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those resources directly used by the design as well as those indirectly used resources for fault 
handling modules and redundant blocks.  
To analyze to the crux of the problem, lets layout some fundamental definitions pertaining 
system sustainability: 
 
f(t): Fault probability distribution density as a function of time. Whether the fault distribution 
follows linear, Poisson, normal, Gaussian, binomial, hypergeometric, etc distribution, it is a 
significant factor that can impact system sustainability. 
Ci: Cost in unit resource which denotes the fault impact as the number of resources damaged by 
that fault. Different fault types may entail different resource damage patterns and therefore may 
incur different cost values. Moreover, if the repair technique employed sets resources in spatial 
groups “tiles” in which when a resource within a tile becomes faulty the entire tile is marked out 
faulty, then the cost is equal to the number of resources in a tile. 
Rd: Resources actually utilized by the design. 
Rc(t): Resources consumed as function of time. This quantity represents the number of originally 
unutilized resources consumed for fault recovery at any instance of time. 
Ravail(t): Resources available for repair as function of time. 
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Availthr: Availability threshold which represents the minimum availability level below which the 
mission fails. 
T: System targeted lifetime. 
Tmax: maximum duration the mission can sustain within the desired availability threshold given 
sufficient Ravail. 
Rrep(t): System reparability which refers to the capability of a fault-tolerant-system to repair itself 
and recover from a fault.  This value may degrade over time as the mission progresses. 
MTTR0: Mean time to refurbish at t0, i.e. the beginning of the mission. 
η: Reparability depreciating factor. 
 
Sustainability Hypothesis: A system can be sustainable if and only if the number of resources 
available for fault refurbishment at time t0, equals or exceeds the number of resources actually 
needed for fault recovery throughout the mission lifetime T as shown in Eq. (2). This statement 
assumes the capability of the repairing mechanism to always achieve fault repair given the 
availability of resources. The characteristic that such capability to repair degrades over time as 










Proof: By contradiction. 
The expression shown in Eq. (2) is a special case which assumes a discrete Rc(t). However, fault 
incidents are modeled to occur with a continuous probability distribution function in time. If the 
repair process is triggered only at discrete points in time corresponding to a “periodic check” 
procedure, then Eq. (2) still holds true. If otherwise, then Eq. (2) is transformed to reflect the 







cavail dttRnR )()(  Eq. (3) 
















Hence, a system could be sustainable if and only if the ratio in Eq. (4) is satisfied. Rc(t) is the 
number of resources consumed on system recovery at time t. Since this is a forward-looking 
value that can only be measured with certainty after such event occurs, a probabilistic model 
)(
~
tRc  is used to approximate the number beforehand.   
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Definition of Resource Consumption Estimator:  
)(
~
tRc : Estimates the number of resources to be consumed on system recovery at time t. 
Given the fault probability density function (pdf) and the cost associated with the fault event we 
















  Eq. (5) 
Where i is the rate of the fault of the type “i”. Fault rate is the reciprocal of the Mean Time To 






MTTF can be calculated from the fault‟s pdf using the analysis which follows.  From the 




 dxxxfXE )(][  Eq. (7) 
Since the random variable discussed herein is time, the negative part of the integration is omitted 
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 Eq. (13) hereafter is called the Sustainability Test Ratio (STR). It holds true under the following 
assumptions: 
Assumption 1: Faults are independent. 
Assumption 2: Successful reparability given sufficient number of unutilized resources. 
Assumption 3: Constant fault arrival rate. Most common analysis assumes the “Exponential 
Failure Law” in which the fault rate is assumed constant. This is based on the bathtub curve 
relationship between the fault rate and time where the fault rate is very high in the beginning 
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“Infant Mortality Phase” then it stabilizes “Useful Life Period” and finally it grows high again 
“Wear-Out Phase.” 
Assumption 4: MTTR < MTTF. Once MTTR becomes greater than MTTF, the system becomes 
unavailable. 
 
6.1.1. Combining Multiple Faults 
 
When multiple independent fault types exhibit different pdfs impact the same resource type with 
the same cost factor, then f(t) that represents the combined pdf of all the faults can be obtained to 
simplify the analysis. For example, if we have two independent types of faults, the combined pdf 
is calculated as follows: 
)()())(1)(())(1)(()( 211221 tftftftftftftf   Eq. (14) 
To limit the scope of this analysis to a tractable boundary, the single fault model is assumed. In 
the single fault model, only one fault can occur at a certain instance of time. In that case, the 
exclusivity of fault occurrence makes faults no longer independent.  Under the single fault 
model, Eq. (14) reduces to: 
))(1)(())(1)(()( 1221 tftftftftf   Eq. (15) 
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6.1.2. Resource Recycling 
When a fault occurs, the resources impacted can be affected by the fault differently. Some 
resource can be totaled while others could become partially broken. For example, when a TDDB 
fault occurs in a 4-input LUT in an FPGA chip on one of its input pins, it can cause a stuck-at 
fault on that input port. This incident renders that LUT failing to serve its functionality as a 4-
input function generator. Nevertheless, this same defective LUT can still be used in another part 
of the system logic as a 3-input function generator that doesn‟t exploit the faulty input as shown 































































Figure 28. Resource Recycling 
Nonetheless, not every failed resource may be recyclable. For example, a stuck-at-(zero, one or 
open) fault at the output pin of an LUT leaves that output insensitive to its inputs variations and 
hence makes it un-refurbishable for use as any downgraded part and consequently averts its 
leveragability. Another example is the fault that causes a stuck-at-open or a slow switching gate 
on any of the LUT‟s input ports. This creates a meta-stability behavior in the address decoding 
logic with which output consistency becomes no longer guaranteed. 
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Upon repair, unused resources could be used by the repair mechanism to replace broken ones. 
This loss of preserved resources is considered resource consumption or positive-cost in the 
closed system model. Likewise, and again upon repair, some partially broken resources which 
have been already retired and deemed unusable might be recycled and rehabilitated again after 
being knocked out in previous repair episodes. This reemployment of a previously retired 
resource is considered resource production or negative-cost in this context. Reflecting this 





















6.1.3. Reparability and its Relation to Sustainability 
System‟s reparability refers to the capability of the fault-tolerant-System to repair itself and 
recover at the incident of a fault. Reparability degrades exponentially by time as the system 
undergoes faults during its operational lifetime. When system is placed under repair, the services 
the system presents become unavailable during the repair process. Hence, it is not enough for a 
sustainable system to repair itself upon fault occurrences but equally importantly do that in a 
timely manner that maintains its availability. System availability in this context is the percentage 







  Eq. (19) 
 As the system might be prone to multiple fault types, the more generic availability expression is 














 Eq. (20) 
The summation in the equation above adds up the percentage of time the system is unavailable 
due to all subject fault types. From the discussion in section-2.3, we will only consider TDDB 



















tyAvailabili 1  Eq. (21) 
TDDB and EM faults are repaired using complicated techniques such as cell swapping and 
Genetic Algorithms or re-placement and routing. Time to repair in such cases has an increasing 
trend with time. The system undergoes hard faults as time goes by and that decreases the number 
of possible solutions for the repair mechanism to restore lost functionality. This leads to 
increasing MTTR and hence a decaying system Availability over time. The increase in MTTR 
depends on the repair mechanism. However, in general it increases exponentially with time as 
shown in Eq. (22). 
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teMTTRtMTTR 0)(   Eq. (22) 
Where MTTR0 is the initial mean time to repair at the beginning of the mission and λ.t is 
basically the cumulative number of faults the system has had up to time t. As a result, system 
























TDDB  Eq. (23) 
If the minimum acceptable availability for a given mission is denoted by Availthr, then 





































 Eq. (24) 
To solve Eq. (24), let 
min1 Availk  , C1=MTTRTDDB0,  X1=ηTDDB . λTDDB, Y1 = MTTFTDDB, C2 = 
MTTREM0, X2 = ηEM . λEM, Y2 = MTTFEM, 





















  Eq. (25) 
Let max
T









 Eq. (26) 
The polynomial equation can be solved to obtain Tmax which represents the maximum lifetime in 
which the subject system maintains Availmin. If only one fault type is considered for example, 






















 Eq. (27) 
 
As a result, a system is anticipated to be sustainable if and only if T ≤ Tmax  and STR ≥ 1.  In 
the next section, these metrics are applied to realistic benchmark circuits for illustration. 
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6.2. MCNC Benchmarks Case Study 
To illustrate the sustainability model, we consider the circuits in MCNC benchmark set. Table 16 
lists the resource utilization numbers of the benchmark circuits implemented on Xilinx Virtex-4 
XC4VSX35 FPGA device.  
Table 16. MCNC Benchmark Circuits on Xilinx Virtex-4 xc4vsx35 FPGA 
Circuit Slices LUTs IOB Gates 
alu4 331 645 22 4005 
spex2 459 904 41 5502 
spex4 441 775 28 4995 
ex1010 452 754 20 4857 
misex3 357 672 28 4152 
seq 480 895 76 5457 
spla 482 890 62 5841 
pdc 338 616 56 4071 
 
As we are targeting harsh environment and stressful operating conditions, we obtained the MTTF 
numbers for TDDB and EM faults for a 90-nm technology node from [68, 71, 72]. From [72], 
table-19 shows the high sensitivity of the MTTF numbers to temperature. For example, the 
MTTF of XC3S5000 device drops from 49 years down to 3 years when the temperature rises 
from 85°C to 125°C.  In [71], the authors considered the worst case numbers in their analysis. 
Their results show a TDDB failure rate of 10% LUT/year and EM failure rate of 0.2%/year in the 
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first 12-years of the MCNC benchmark circuits. On the other hand, [68] reported less sever 
failure rates. For the sake of analysis and without the loss of generality, we considered two sets 
of failure rate values for harsh environments:  a conservative of (λTDDB 1%/year, λEM 0.2%) and a 
pessimistic of (λTDDB 5%/year, λEM 0.4%). The pessimistic numbers are obtained by prorating the 
rates from [71] considering a space mission where extreme temperatures may be encountered as 
satellites shined upon or shadowed by sun with no atmosphere. 
Genetic Algorithms are considered as the repair mechanism. Without the loss of generality, 
we will assume that all the configuration bits are “essential bits” i.e. bits that make the design 
erroneous when flipped. This is a strictly conservative assumption that can be relaxed given the 
mission criticality. This can be replaced by a de-rating factor if tools that can extract the essential 
bits of a design are available such as COSMIC, SEUPI, or Essential Bit Technology from Xilinx. 
Moreover, we will assume that IiCi  ,1 . This means when a fault occurs, it affects one 
resource. In reality, a fault may affect parts of the resource. E.g. a TDDB fault in one transistor 
of an LUT may damage one of its SRAM cells and not necessarily the entire array.  Initially, 
let‟s assume that the faulty LUT is completely unusable “worst case” and hence no resource 
recycling is considered i.e. 0producedC .  In the GA used, the circuit is divided into N groups of 
contiguous resources called Tiles. Each tile has a Concurrent Error Detection CED mechanism 
to detect erroneous outputs. GA convergence time grows exponentially with increased number of 
genomes in the chromosomal representation. Hence, partitioning the design into multiple tiles, 
each evolved separately, substantially reduces the GA scalability issues. Redundant resources are 
sparse across the design in Amorphous Resource Pool ARP arrangement. Resources in ARP do 
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not have a designated functionality in design. GA makes use of ARP resources to restore lost 
functionality due to fault by evolving a new functional bitstream from the FPGA fabric after 
taking into account the fault. A C++ simulator was built to evaluate the GA convergence time 
for a tile of 40-LUTs with 1 to 8 faults. The GA parameters are listed in Table 17. They were 
selected based on preliminary runs to evaluate the optimal set of parameters for the problem in 
hand.  
Table 17. ARP-based GA Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Population Size 50 
Mutation Rate 0.5% 
Crossover Rate 60% 
Tournament Size 5 
Elitism 2 
 
The GA convergence time is translated from simulation generations into intrinsic evolution 
time using numbers previously obtained in [40]. An Arena discrete simulation model was built 
for each of the aforementioned MCNC benchmarks to evaluate the reparability decay based on 
the GA simulations. The simulation points were fitted into corresponding exponential curve. 
MTTF and MTTR results for the conservative and pessimistic cases are listed in Table 18 and 
Table 19 respectively. Should another repair mechanism be considered, similar experiments need 
to be conducted to evaluate the reparability decay expression and then be plugged into the 
model. 
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Table 18. MCNC Benchmark Circuits ARP-based GA Reparability Decay (Conservative) 
Circuit 
Conservative: λTDDB=1%, λEM=0.2%  
Time unit: years 


























Table 19. MCNC Benchmark Circuits ARP-based GA Reparability Decay (Pessimistic) 
Circuit 
Pessimistic: λTDDB=5%, λEM=0.4% 
Time unit: years 



























First the model is applied to calculate Tmax for several AvailThr values [99.6% – 80%] where 
complete refurbishment was mandated given the conservative deployment parameters listed in 
Table 18. The results are depicted in Figure 29. The model is then used to calculate Ravail lower 
bound values required to sustain the corresponding Tmax. The results are depicted in Figure 30. 
As can be inferred from the results, as the AvailThr is relaxed to lower values, the mission 
sustains longer durations. For instance, spex2 benchmark deployed in such an environment with 
the aforementioned GA technique employed, and Availthr of 99% is anticipated to sustain for 5 
years during which it will require an ARP size of around 50 un-utilized reconfigurable resources 
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Figure 29. MCNC Tmax vs. Availability (Conservative, QOR: 100%, Simplex) 
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It can also be inferred from Figure 29 and Figure 30 that in general the missions with smaller 
designs are sustainable for longer periods. Yet they require ARP sizes which makes sense 
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Figure 30. Resource Required for Refurbishment (Conservative, QOR: 100%, Simplex) 
Availability threshold requirements vary from one mission to another. For example, if the 
mission involves a real-time live broadcast such as audio/video conversations or surveillance 
missions in which continuous coverage is sought after, high availability threshold is required. 
Whereas, if it is a data collection and transmission task in which there is little time sensitivity 
associated, a relatively low availability threshold can be tolerated. Moreover, although high 
availability thresholds might appear sufficient, the implied downtime might be more substantial 
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when taking the mission duration into consideration. For example an availability threshold of 
99% implies a downtime of 15-minutes a day, 876-hours in a 10-year mission, and a complete 1 
year in a 100-year mission. 
In order to extend mission lifetime in which high availability thresholds are sustained, the 
organic GA-based RARS architecture described in Chapter 3 can be used. Upon failure of one 
Functional Element (FE), the Autonomic Element (AE) places the system into triplex mode. This 
will guarantee a correct output if at least two of the three FEs are working properly. This 
arrangement leads to increased fault tolerance in the system as a whole, and consequently results 
in an extended mission lifetime with high availability threshold sustained. 
In order to better understand the advantage of using the RARS scheme to extend the mission 
lifetime, let the availability of the three FEs be: A1, A2, and A3 respectively. Then the 
availability of the organic unit becomes: 
321132231321 )1()1()1( AAAAAAAAAAAAARARS   Eq. (28) 
Eq. (28) combines the incidents in which the three or any two of the three FEs are available. 
Since the three units are identical and are implemented on the same device, it is reasonable to 
assume that A1 = A2 = A3. In this case Eq. (28) becomes: 
32 23 AAARARS   Eq. (29) 
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From Eq. (29) above, if the mission availability threshold requirement is 99.9% for example, 
then each unit needs to maintain a threshold of only 98% which is a considerable gain. Figure 31 
and Figure 32 show the extended mission lifetime of the MCNC benchmarks under RARS setup 
and the resource requirements respectively. It can be seen from the figure that higher availability 
levels such as 99.99% that were intractable in the simplex configuration are now achievable 
under RARS. Another look at the spex2 benchmark numbers with RARS configuration, it can be 
seen that the same reference point of 99.6% Availthr, TMax went up from 1 year in simplex to 
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The extended mission lifetime due to RARS does not come at no expense, on the contrary, it 
entails area and power penalties over the simplex configuration. From sustainability point of 
view, RARS scheme requires larger ARP sizes in order to refurbish the three units. Figure 32 
shows the number of resources needed for refurbishment for the RARS version of the circuits 
from the MCNC benchmark. Considering spex2 circuit again, the resources required went up 
from 11 in simplex to 300 under TMR for 99.6% Availthr. This is not solely due to RARS 
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Figure 32. Resource Required for Refurbishment (Conservative, 100%QOR, RARS) 
 
Another important attribute to consider is the Quality-Of-Refurbishment (QOR), which 
represents the fitness level at which refurbished design is qualified for functional operation. In 
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many cases, mission can still make use of a partially refurbished design. For example, in video 
processing applications the system may be useful despite the missing or clobbered few pixels in 
a frame. Since fitness is what guides the evolutionary search, the GA focuses on the genes of 
features that give the highest contribution to the fitness of the individuals. These genes - quite 
interestingly - converge relatively early in the evolution process and then it takes most of the GA 
time to resolve the remaining finer parts of the problem. This property is clearly inferred from 
the results listed in the fourth column in Table 20. 
Table 20. ARP-based GA Evolution Results 
# Faults 
Ave. # Generations 
95% Fitness 
Ave. # Generations 
100% Fitness 
% of the GA Runtime 
to evolve 95% Fitness 
# Runs 
1 114 3962 2.88% 100 
2 1230 31352 3.92% 50 
3 3920 38601 10.16% 50 
4 9238 63307 14.59% 30 
5 11958 88746 13.47% 
Interpolated  
(Curve Fitting) 
6 19527 133248 14.65% 
Interpolated  
(Curve Fitting) 
7 31887 200066 15.94% 
Interpolated  
(Curve Fitting) 
8 51981 290643 17.88% 10 
 
Figure 33 shows how various MCNC benchmark lifetimes are substantially extended when 
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Figure 33. MCNC Benchmarks Tmax versus Availability (Conservative, QOR: 95%, 
Simplex) 
 
Considering spex2 benchmark numbers again, it can be seen that the same reference point of 
99.6% Availthr, TMax went up from 1 year to about 12 years. It goes further up to 19 years with 
RARS and QOR of 95% as shown in Figure 34. Similar results were obtained for the 
pessimistically severe environment parameters listed in Table 19. The pessimistic numbers are 
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Figure 34. MCNC Tmax versus Availability (Conservative, 95%QOR, RARS) 
6.3. Sustainability of a Realistic Mission Use-Case 
FPGAs have been commonly deployed in space. Examples are plenty such as MARS Rovers [88], 
THEMIS [64],  NASA DAWN [89], SpaceCube [90], and many others. There is a policy for all 
future US space missions to be "reprogrammable". This indicates the growing importance 
autonomous FPGA-based systems are gaining in this domain. 
The use-case presented in this section is based on the MESSENGER space mission [91]. This is 
an on-going 8-year mission to explore planet Mercury. The harshness of the environment this 
mission undergoes is immense. The sunny side of the planet is at (800°F) while the dark side is 
at (-300°F). Due to the limited payload technical details, we are hypothesizing an FPGA payload 
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of the edge-detector design described in Chapter 3 under the organic GA-based RARS 
architecture. A RARS-based 256x256pixels 50MHz Sobel Video Edge Detector implemented on 
XCV4SX35 Xilinx Vertex-4 FPGA is considered. RARS can run under simplex, duplex, or 
triplex Functional Element (FE) configurations depending on the fitness of its FEs and the 
resource availability. It implements intrinsic GA that places the actual FPGA chip in the loop for 
online fitness assessment. Evolution takes place using the random single point crossover and 
mutation genetic operators. After partitioning the edge-detector‟s design into ARP tiles of 40-
LUT each, and using the GA times obtained in [40] after scaling to Vertex-4 and the partial 
reconfiguration latency from [92], we obtained MTTR(t) = 0.571e
0.0306λt
. GA parameters used are 
listed in Table 17. The mission is assumed to be tolerant to soft faults through radiation-
hardening techniques and through scrubbing inherent in RARS. Since the MTTRsoft << 
MTTRhard, we are not including soft-faults in the analysis. 
Again, we used the MTTFTDDB and MTTFEM values reported in [71] which corresponds to the 
same 90-nm technology node. Using the sustainability model, we obtained the results for the 
conservative and pessimistic environments shown in Table 21 and Table 22 respectively. 
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Table 21. RARS Sobel Edge-Detector with ARP-based GA Sustainability Results 
(Conservative) 
Conservative: λTDDB=1%, λEM=0.2% 
Time unit: years 
Constant Model 
Inputs 




QOR MTTRTDDB(t) MTTREM(t) AvailThr 







99.99% × 53 2.71 
99.9%   231 10.9 
95% 6.5E-5e
0. 183t 6.5E-5e0. 037t 99.99%   289 13.27 
 
 
Table 22. RARS Sobel Edge-Detector with ARP-based GA Sustainability Results (Pessimistic) 
Conservative: λTDDB=5%, λEM=0.4% 
Time unit: years 
Constant Model 
Inputs 




QOR MTTRTDDB(t) MTTREM(t) AvailThr 







99.6% × 61 0.60 
90% × 423 3.52 
80% × 520 4.15 
50% × 722 5.30 
95% 6.5E-5e
0.729t 6.5E-5e0.073t 
99.6% × 356 3.05 
90% × 761 5.5 




As can be seen from the results in Table 21, where conservative deployment conditions are 
assumed, the design can sustain the 8-year mission with 99.9% availability and QOR of 100% 
under RARS configuration. Furthermore, it can sustain that level of performance for around 
11years. It requires an ARP of 231 resources to be budgeted for refurbishment. The Availability 
degradation and ARP resources consumed during the 8-year Messenger mission with the 
hypothetical Sobel Edge-detector in RARS are shown in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35. Sobel Edge-detector Availability and ARP Consumption (Conservative) 
For QOR of 95%, which is equivalent to 3k bad pixels in an edge detected frame of 65k-pixels, 
the mission can sustain up to 13.27 years. A triplex configuration with modules of individual 
138 
QOR of 95% has a higher resultant QOR on the voted output given the probability of different 
failure articulation amongst the three modules. Therefore, the numbers above represent the worst 
case values.  
On the other hand, if we assume the pessimistically severe conditions which might represent the 
conditions in which the satellite is close to the sun-shined upon surface of Mercury, we notice 
that mission sustainability drops to significantly shorter periods. As can be seen in Table 22, with 
no QOR degradation, the design could barely sustain 99.6% availability for as short as 0.6 years. 
The longest period the design is able to sustain is around 5-years with 50% availability. This 
means a downtime of 2.5years. To achieve that, an ARP size of 722 resources is needed which is 
40% of the actual design size in triplex configuration. The mission is only sustainable QOR  of 
95% and availability threshold of 50% is tolerable. Although this might be considered a very 
poor system performance, yet, under such severe conditions, where aging is expedited at such 
high rates, systems typically become un-usable. With the fault tolerance built in RARS, the 
system will intermittently continue capturing images 50% of the time for Mercury with QOR of 
95% which is by far better than total shutdown. The Availability degradation and ARP resources 
consumed during the 8-year Messenger mission with the hypothetical Sobel Edge-detector in 
RARS under the pessimistically sever conditions are shown in Figure 36. 
Moreover, higher availability can be sustained at the expense of quality. Hence, using the 
sustainability model presented herein, such Availability-QOR trade-offs can be analyzed and 
favored between according to the mission needs at design time. 
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Figure 36. Sobel Edge-detector Availability and ARP Consumption (Pessimistic) 
Besides the sustainability benefits RARS offers, it also incurs less power consumption compared 
to the widely-adopted Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) industry standard. Due to the 
capability to toggle between duplex and triplex modes, RARS consumes less dynamic active 
power over TMR. In order to quantify the power benefits of RARS, we will consider the TMR 
platform described in [16] augmented with our enhanced intrinsic evolution. A percentage of 
33% power savings result from RARS when the organic unit is running in duplex mode. RARS 
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operates in duplex when the three FEs are healthy and available. Hence, the probability of 
running in duplex mode denoted by Pduplex is shown in Eq. (30). 
321 AAAPduplex   Eq. (30) 
From Table 21, RARS is able to attain AvailThr of 99.9% for the 8-year mission to Mercury 
under conservative failure model. This requires Availability of 98.2% for each individual FE 
using Eq. (29). Since the three FEs have identical Availability, Pduplex = 94.7%. This means that 
RARs consumes 33% less active power during 7.5 years out of the 8-year mission lifetime over 
TMR. Since Availability is a decreasing function with time as shown in Eq. (24), similarly power 
savings are also decreasing with time as the system spends more time in triplex mode. 
It is worth mentioning that we don‟t consider Availability numbers less than 50% for triplex 
voting systems. The availability of the entire system falls below the availability of a single 
module under simplex configuration once the availability of the individual modules falls below 
50%. This can be inferred from Eq. (29). 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation introduces a novel sustainable autonomic architecture for organically 
reconfigurable FGPA-based computing systems. The following sections summarize the work 
done, provide research-related discussions on points of interest, and identify several directions 
for future extensions to this work. 
7.1. Technical Summary 
A novel architecture consists of a hardware-based organic layer and a software-based cognitive 
layer is presented.  Components at the organic layer are organized into overlapping functional 
groups called Organic Units (OU). Each OU bears responsibility for a particular set of mission-
relevant tasks.  Self-monitoring and self-healing is demonstrated at the OU level. Within the 
cognitive layer, monitoring and diagnostic processes continually track the behavior of these 
functional groups and determine whether their behavior characteristics fall within expected 
profiles. 
Challenges include the AE impact on the functional flow due to augmenting additional non-
functional monitoring modules within the datapath, the system capability to gracefully switch 
between different modes according the health status, Organic-Cognitive communication 
infrastructure, and others were addressed and undertaken. To verify the architecture validity, an 
organic layer is prototyped on XC4VSX35 FPGA on Xilinx Virtex-4 Video Starter Kit. A Sobel 
2-D spatial gradient measurement video edge-detector was implemented as the organic 
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functional element use-case. This represents a class of applications commonly found on 
satellites. Moreover, the software-hardware communication mechanism is implemented and 
verified along with a complete implementation of an intrinsic evolution platform for evolutionary 
repair. Stuck-at one and stuck-at zero hardware faults are introduced in several potential 
scenarios. An appropriate and smooth transition from the different redundancy modes is 
demonstrated. 
A 16-bit wide serial message-based communication protocol between the cognitive and organic 
layers is developed. Experiments have shown that a transmission rate of 5mbps is achievable 
using the Xilinx Parallel Cable 4. The efficiently concise protocol message allows the system to 
handle more than 300,000 messages per second per FPGA board. Hence no communication 
bandwidth congestion is observed. 
A Genetic Algorithm (GA)-based hardware/software platform for intrinsic evolvable hardware is 
designed and evaluated for digital circuit repair using a variety of well-accepted benchmarks. 
Dynamic bitstream compilation for enhanced mutation and crossover operators is achieved by 
directly manipulating the bitstream using a layered toolset. Experimental results on the edge-
detector organic system prototype have shown complete organic online refurbishment after a 
hard fault. In contrast to previous toolsets requiring many milliseconds or seconds, an average of 
0.47 microseconds is required to perform the genetic mutation, 4.2 microseconds to perform the 
single point conventional crossover, 3.1 microseconds to perform Partial Match Crossover 
(PMX) as well as Order Crossover (OX), 2.8 microseconds to perform Cycle Crossover (CX), 
and 1.1 milliseconds for one input pattern intrinsic evaluation. These represent a performance 
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advantage of three orders of magnitude over the JBITS software framework and more than seven 
orders of magnitude over the Xilinx design flow. Combinatorial Group Testing (CGT) technique 
was combined with the conventional GA in what is called CGT-pruned GA to reduce repair time 
and increase system availability. Results have shown a substantial speedup enhancement of up to 
37.6% convergence advantage using the pruned technique. 
Graceful degradation was achieved with the existence of multiple faults and relatively fast 
refurbishment of 95% of functionality in the few hundreds of generations has resulted in fast 
system recovery even under multiple faults even when the three functional elements were 
malfunctioning. 
Lastly, in this dissertation a quantitative stochastic sustainability model for FPGA-based 
reparable systems is formulated. This model estimates at design-time the resources required for 
refurbishment in order to meet mission availability, quality and lifetime requirements in a given 
fault-prone ecosystem. This model is applied to circuits from the MCNC benchmark set with 
variations of parameters for illustration. Results show the estimated capability of these designs to 
sustain harsh environments with the means of GA-based evolutionary repair. Various 
Availability, Longevity, and Quality trade-offs are discussed. Additionally, the sustainability of a 
real-life space mission is analyzed. The analysis demonstrates how mission‟s sustainability and 
useful lifetime can be extended by exploiting FPGA resources available aboard when applied to 
our organic sustainable platform. Results show how mission availability drops from 99.9% to 
50% with 5% degradation in quality in order to sustain an 8-year mission as the aging-induced 
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failure rates jump from conservative value (MTTFTDDB=0.17years , MTTFEM=0.83years) to rather 
pessimistic values (MTTFTDDB=0.03years , MTTFEM=0.42years). 
Furthermore, un-utilized resources budgeted for refurbishment purposes are arranged into 
Amorphous Resource Pools (ARP) are estimated using the model. The overhead of ARP can 
range from relatively small values of 12% in the conservative environment up to large 
percentages of 78% in the pessimistic assumed environment on top of the triplex overhead to 
cover the loss in resources due to hard faults. 
7.2. Future Work 
The work presented in this dissertation introduces a comprehensive platform that closes the loop 
from theory, to implementation, and ending by evaluation and analysis. However, as in other 
scientific fields, the research does not stop at a certain point, and the call for enhancement and 
advancement shall go on. Likewise, the work herein builds on previous research efforts and 
technology improvements, and also serves as a framework for future efforts to carry out new 
breakthroughs and research directions. Below are few directions that I would like to pursue 
within my post-graduate research activities: 
i. Complete System-on-Chip (SoC) Platform:  
The organic architecture implementation presented in this dissertation incorporated a PC to 
host the cognitive layer software stubs and the GA engine. This implementation entails many 
overheads and limitations such as the weight, area, and power overheads of the host PC, and 
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the noisy bandwidth-bound communication medium. The sustainability of the entire PC 
components becomes another hurdle to worry about.  
The proposed architecture, however, is not limited to this implementation, and those software 
stubs are likely to perform better should they be implemented on the same chip where the 
organic layer they monitor resides. Thankfully, most of the recent FPGAs come equipped 
with a general purpose microprocessor on chip such as IBM PowerPC. If GA is carried out 
on the on-chip processor, and uses the Internal Configuration Access Port (ICAP) for faster 
reconfiguration, this will naturally yield a much faster evolution and smaller MTTR and 
consequently better system sustainability. Having that done, on-chip software stubs fault-
tolerance becomes another horizon to explore.  
ii. Fault Tolerant Golden Element:  
Within the autonomic computing context, golden elements which represent a single point of 
failure are not tolerable. However, eliminating them given the numerous probable fault 
scenarios is not possible. The existence of single points of failure in the system reduces its 
reliability and could jeopardize its chances to demonstrate its organic properties. Although 
we cannot eliminate the golden elements from the organic system, we can still minimize their 
effect by minimizing their failure articulation probability. Such state can be achieved by 
creating a cross-monitoring capability among the system‟s golden elements.  
In the proposed organic architecture, the Autonomic Element (AE) is a golden element within 
the Organic Unit (OU). Therefore, the organic architecture described in this dissertation 
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enables the cognitive layer to catch potential problems within the AEs and reconfigure with 
alternative bitstreams to work-around the issue. This approach will be limited by the capacity 
of the alternative bitstreams. A better approach to pursue is by leveraging the identical AEs 
of the multiple OUs on the same chip into a triplex configuration similar to the current FE 
configuration. This will enable AE intrinsic evolutionary refurbishment. Similarly, the 
identical AE design property leveraged to investigate cycling one AE temporally to monitor 
all the OUs within a chip. The scheduling of the AE monitoring time allocation to the various 
OUs can be prioritized according to the criticality of the task the OU performes. 
iii. CGT-Pruned GA with Multiple Faults:  
CGT-Pruned GA repair technique was evaluated for a single fault scenario. Nevertheless, as 
time goes by, the system is likely to get hit with more faults and consequently the culprit 
resources number increases. This implies that a wider portion of the un-useful evolution 
search space will likely be pruned out which leads to even higher convergence speedup 
advantage. 
iv. Sustainability Model for Multi-Phase Missions:  
Many missions are staged into multiple phases. Each phase may have its specific availability 
and performance needs and may experience different deployment environment 
characteristics. The sustainability model shall be further extended to cover multi-phase 
missions where different Availability, Quality, and Longevity trade-offs take place in each 
phase. 
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This is the module from the cognitive layer interacting with the AES 
stub. 
AE (Autonomic Element) AE Hardware circuitry that resides on the FPGA, communicates 
with AES via USB port. 
FE (Functional Element) Functional module that resides on the FPGA. 




Another software module responsible for refurbishing AEs and FEs 
upon the request of CLS. 
Timer Responsible for firing periodical events to the AES to synchronize 
its functionality with other modules. 
Table 24. AES and FES Use Cases 
 
Use Case Actor Description 
Establish Connection with AE AE The AES should be able to establish connection with the AEs through USB 
ports. This connection will be used later to carry messages between the organic 
layer and the AES. 
Send Message to AE AE AES needs to send messages to AEs in order to send commands, request 
status, and control the overall operation of the organic layer. 
Receive Message from AE AE AES should be able to poll the USB port for messages coming from the 
hardware, including reporting and status messages. 
Establish Connection with CLS CLS This connection should be initialized for communication between the AES and 
the cognitive layer. 
Send Message to CLS CLS AES collects statistics and reporting messages from the organic layer and 
pushes it to the CLS through the available socket connection. 
Receive Message from CLS CLS Control messages from the CLS to the organic layer is collected by the AES 
and marshaled with the required parameters to the AEs and RM. 
Initiate Refurbishment RM The AES should be able to command the RM to start the refurbishment 
process; all the settings should be specified along with the bit files that have to 
be used. 
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Use Case Actor Description 
Read Refurbishment Results RM Upon refurbishment completion, the RM reports the results to the AES who in 
turn sends them to the CLS to facilitate decision making in the cognitive layer. 
Check Queue Timer The AES checks the message queues periodically searching for new messages 
from the various modules; this event should be triggered by a timer module that 
can be customized to support different level of responsiveness. 
Establish Connection with FE FE The FES should be able to establish connection with the FEs through USB 
ports. This connection will be used later to carry messages between the organic 
layer and the FES. 
Receive Message from FE FE FES should be able to poll the USB port for messages coming from the FEs. 
Establish Connection with PM PM This connection should be initialized for communication between the FES and 
the cognitive layer. 
Send Message to PM PM FES sends functional output from the organic layer and pushes it to the PM 
through the available socket connection. 
Figure 37 depicts the Use-Case diagram of the AES and FES. Unified Modeling Language 
(UML) notation is used where the ovals represent use cases. The multiplicity of the relations is 




























































Table 25. AES and FES Class Description 
 
Class Description 
Connection Responsible for managing the physical communication with the external modules. It 
supports two implementations (USB, Socket). 
CommunicationController Manages one or many connections (e.g., multiple USB connections to different AEs). 
Instantiated and used by the module managers. 
Message Simple class that carries message information. 
Timer Responsible for firing cyclic events to module managers to support periodic processes 
(e.g., polling messages, manage inbox, etc.) 
Dispatcher Implements asynchronous communication between module managers. 
AEManager Holds detailed view of the organic layer (could be read from a configuration file that 
contains the organic layer structure such as available AEs/FEs and their addresses) 
and manages sending and receiving messages to/from AEs. 
CLSManager Responsible for sending and receiving messages to/from CLS.  
RMManager Controls initiating refurbishment and reporting results. 
FEManager Holds details of the FEs in the organic layer and manages receiving functional output 
from the FEs. 
PMManager Responsible for sending messages to the PM in the CL. 
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This is the smallest integrated unit in the organic layer. It consists of one AE and three FEs. 
Initially, it is configured with only two FEs online and one cold-spare standby. If discrepancy is 
detected, the AE switches to TMR mode (i.e., puts the cold-spare FE online and implements a 
voting scheme). 
An FPGA can accommodate one or more organic unites based on the unit complexity and the 
FPGA resources. 
FES 
Functional Element Stub: This is a software component responsible for polling the messages 
from the FEs through a physical link (e.g., USB connection) and delivering them to the PM 
module in the cognitive layer through sockets. 
AES 
Autonomic Element Stub: This is a software component responsible for polling the messages 
from the AEs through a physical link (e.g., USB connection) and delivering them to the CLS 
module in the cognitive layer through sockets. 
RM 
Refurbishment Manager: This is a software component responsible for running refurbishment 
algorithms (e.g., Genetic Algorithm). 
CLS 
Cognitive Layer Stub.  This is a software component in the cognitive layer responsible for 




Table 27. FES Connection Protocol 
 
Protocol Attribute Description 
Implementation Socket communication 
Purpose Report functional outputs of organic units 
Direction Unidirectional from FES to CLS 
Communication Type Asynchronous (Producer/Consumer) 











Message Trigger(s) Functional output ready 
Message Description 
Message sent from the FES to the CLS at every functional output 
production. The Discrepancy bit is asserted upon discrepant outputs 
indicating the invalidity of the current output. 
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Table 28. AES Connection Messages 
No. Message Name Description 
From CLS To AES  
1 FE_STATUS_REQUEST Message sent from the CLS to the organic layer to query the status of 
any FE. 
2 TMR_ACTIVATION_REQUEST The CLS sends this message whenever TMR is needed; this could be 
due to performance degradation. 
3 REFURBISH _REQUEST The CLS sends this message when refurbishment is needed, either 
due to faulty FE(s) or performance degradation below mission  
requirements. 
4 FE_STATUS_CHANGE _REQUEST The CLS sends this message whenever FE status change is needed. 
5 PING _REQUEST The CLS sends this message to check the health of the AE(s) 
6 
RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST 
The CLS sends this message to reconfigure an FE and change its 
 functionality. 
7 DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REQUEST The CLS sends this message to revert TMR mode into the normal 
duplex mode upon successful repair or broken FE decommission. 
8 GET_OL_CONFIGURATION_REQUEST The CLS sends this message to request the configuration of the  
organic layer. 
From AES To CLS 
9 DISCREPANCY_REPORT  This message is sent when an AE detects discrepancy among its FEs. 
The message contains the input that articulated the discrepancy along 
with the FE configuration at that time (TMR or duplex). 
10 FE_STATUS_REPORT Response to message 1 and 4 
11 
TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT 
Either as a response to message 2 or an acknowledgment of the TMR 
activation in case it is autonomously done by the organic layer. 
12 REFURBISH _REPORT Response to message 3. The message includes the final fitness of the 
refurbished AE(s). 
13 PING_REPLY Response to Message 5 
14 RECONFIGURATION_REPORT Response to Message 6 
15 DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REPORT Response to Message 7 
16 OL_CONFIGURATION_REPORT Response to Message 8 
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Table 29. AES Connection Messages 
Protocol Attribute Description 
Implementation Socket communication 
Direction Bidirectional 
Communication Type CLSynchronous (Producer/Consumer) 
Message – 1 
Message Name DISCREPANCY_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 
Message Destination CLS 
Message Format 
AE_ID FE_ID TMR FAULT_ ARTICULATION_ INPUTMSG_ CODE
5
Log2  |AE|




Message Trigger(s) Discrepancy detected by the AE 
Message Description 
Message sent whenever an AE detects discrepancy among its FEs. The 
TMR flag is used to specify the configuration of the organic unit when 
the discrepancy was detected. A TMR flag value of 1 indicates that the 
3 FEs were simultaneously used in voting scheme, and the FE_ID in 
this case specifies the discrepant FE, whereas a 0 value indicates the 
original configuration of two online FEs and one Cold-spare standby 
(duplex mode), the FE_ID reflects the address of the cold-standby FE in 
this case. The n-bit FAULT_ARTICULATION_INPUT provides the CLS 
with the actual input that articulated the discrepancy; this could be 
useful for the CLS and/or RM to regenerate the fault scenario during the 
refurbishment process. 
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 2 
Message Name FE_STATUS_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 









Message Trigger(s) CLS initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the CLS to the organic layer to query the 
status of any number of FEs. The addresses of the AEs/FEs can be 
specifically provided to target specific FE or a broadcast address (e.g. 
address zero) can be used to query multiple FEs. For example, if the 
AE_ID is 3 and the FE_ID is 0, the AE that has the address of (3) has to 
respond with three FE_STATUS_REPORT messages (Message-3) for 
each one of its FEs. Also, if the AE_ID field is zero and the FE_ID is 2, 
all AEs in the organic layer have to report the status of their FE with the 
address 2. It is apparent that an FE_STATUS__REQUEST message 
with both AE_ID and FE_ID fields filled with zero means a full broadcast 
to the organic layer to send the status of every single FE to the 
cognitive layer. 
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 3 
Message Name FE_STATUS_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 









Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-2 
Message Description 
Responding to Message-2, an AE has to send one 
FE_STATUS_REPORT message per FE to the CLS. Contrary to 
message-2, The AE_ID and FE_ID fields cannot specify a broadcast 
address in this message; they have to explicitly indicate the sender 
identity. 
Message – 4 
Message Name TMR_ACTIVATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 






Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) 
CLS initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. It could be due to 
performance degradation below the mission requirements for this 
organic unit (FEs and AE). 
 
Message Description 
CLS can send this message to one/all AEs in the organic layer to trigger 
TMR configuration activation. The targeted AE(s) respond by activating 
TMR among FEs and confirm back by sending Message-5 
(TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT) 
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 5 
Message Name TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 






Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) 
- Response to Message-4 
- Autonomous response taken by the AE itself. 
Message Description 
As described in message-4, this message is a confirmation from AE to 
CLS that TMR has been configured among the three FEs as requested 
or a notification to the CLS that the AE has autonomously activated the 
TMR mode. 
Message – 6 
Message Name REFURBISH _REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 










CLS initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. It could be due to 
one of the FEs was reported faulty, or due to performance degradation 
below the mission requirements. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the CLS whenever refurbishment is needed. 
For example this call can initiate running GA to repair faulty FE(s). The 
same principle of broadcast addressing described in Message-2 is 
applicable to this message.  
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 7 
Message Name REFURBISH _REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 











Message Trigger(s) Refurbishment process is finished. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the AE to CLS upon refurbish completion. 
The final fitness value of the refurbished FE is reported in the message 
so that it can be used in future mission-specific decision making. 
Message – 8 
Message Name FE_STATUS_CHANGE _REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 












- FE is put under-repair. 
- FE was refurbished and the CLS decides that it is eligible to be put 
online. 
- FE has failed to be refurbished and claimed un-reparable and hence 
should be decommissioned 
Message Description 
The CLS can send this message to change the status of FE(s). 
Broadcasting can be used to specify more than one FE in a single 
command, provided that they will be changed to the same status. The 
target AE will respond by changing the status of the addressed FE(s) 
and send a confirmation of the change to the CLS (as described in 
Message-2). 
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 9 
Message Name PING _REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 






Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) CLS checks that the AE is alive. 
Message Description 
The Ping message is used by the CLS to check the health of the AEs to 
check if it is minimally responsive. The broadcast addressing can be 
used to ping all the AEs in the organic layer. AEs respond to the Ping 
message by sending a PING_REPLY to the CLS (As described in 
Message-10) 
Message – 10 
Message Name PING_REPLY 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 






Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-9 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the AE to the CLS as a reply for the 
PING_REQUEST (Message-9).  
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 11 
Message Name RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 












- AE is not responding properly (Any failure to respond such as ping 
failure)  
- CLS decided to change the functionality of the organic unit. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the CLS to the AE(s) to change the 
configuration of the corresponding FE(s). The broadcast addressing can 
be used in this message. The AE will respond by downloading the 
requested configuration and reply with the 
RECONFIGURATION_REPORT message (Message-12)  
Message – 12 
Message Name RECONFIGURATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 









Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-11 
Message Description 
This message is a response to the RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST 
(Message-11). 
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 13 
Message Name DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 










Take one FE offline in order to: refurbish, decommission, or switch back 
to normal duplex operation due to fault recovery achievement. 
Message Description 
As the CLS has the capability to instruct AES to switch to TMR mode 
(Message-4), it can also switch it back to duplex mode under the 
situations mentioned above in (Message Triggers). FE_ID field specifies 
the FE module that will be taken offline (the other two FEs will be 
running in duplex mode) 
Message – 14 
Message Name DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 









Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-13 
Message Description 
Once the AE changes the configuration to duplex mode, it reports back 
the new configuration to the CLS, the FE_ID fields indicates the offline 
FE. 
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Protocol Attribute Description 
Message – 15 
Message Name GET_OL_CONFIGURATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source CLS 









CLS initiated when it needs information about how the organic layer is 
organized 
Message Description 
The CLS sends this message to request the configuration of the 
Organic Layer.  
Message – 16 
Message Name OL_CONFIGURATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source AES 
Message Destination CLS 
Message Format Adjacency list 
Message Trigger(s) Response to message-15 
Message Description 
The AES sends this message to report the configuration of the Organic 
Layer, the organization of the organic units is sent in the format of an 
adjacency list. 
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Table 31. 90nm FPGA MTTF [71] 
 
  
a: TDDB b: EM 
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